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Abstract 
This thesis undertakes both a theoretical and an empirical analysis of management 
hierarchies within firms. 
The theoretical work focuses on the information processing model of hierarchies 
pioneered by Radner and Van Zandt. Extensions are made to the one shot batch 
processing model to take account of both tirn~ based payment for labor services 
and the possibility of human error in determining the set of efficient hierarchies. It 
is shown somewhat surprisingly that changing the basis of labor payment does not 
change the efficient set of hierarchies. Two notions of fallibility are develop0d and 
applied in order to more finely characterize the set of efficient hierarchies. 
The information processing model is also applied to a problem from Industrial 
Organization, namely choosing the characteristic for a differentiated product in 
the face of changing and imperfectly observable consumer preferences. It is 
shown that the optimal size of management structure is dependent on the market 
conditions that a firm faces. 
The final part of the thesis takes the supervisor set of hierarchy models and tests 
their empirical implications for wages. It is found that both position in a hierarchy 
and the size of the hierarchy are significant determinants of wages within a human 
capital wage equation applied to Australian males. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
I.I Structure and Process 
The best know observations on organization by an economist must surely be 
Adam Smith's description of a pin factory. He observes that one man, unfamiliar 
with the skills and methods of pin manufacture would hardly be capable of 
making twenty pins in a day. By comparison, ten men, organized in an integrated 
production process of eighteen trades produced upward of forty eight thousand 
pins a day. So that, through the division of labour, average output per person 
rose to four thousand eight hundred pins a day. 
Adam Smith(1982,p112) suggests three channels through which coordinated · 
organization gives rise to higher productivity: 
"This great increase in the quantity of work which, in consequence 
of the division of labour, the same number of people are _capable of 
5 
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performing, is owing to three different circumstances; first, to the 
increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to the 
saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species 
of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of 
machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man 
to do the work of many." 
The first channel which Smith identified is commonly known as specializa-
tion , and is the subject of much analysis in economics. The other two channels 
are examples of improved organization of the production process. 
Production organization features prominently in the business press . The 
superior productivity of Japanese automobile manufacturers as a result of Just In 
Time inventory control, outsourcing and other so called modern manufacturing 
techniques , is one of the best known examples from recent history. Despite 
this widespread interest in production organization, recent economic advances 
in the theory of the firm, such as the principal-agent paradigm, and incomplete 
contracts emphasize incentives instead. 
To understand exactly what I mean by production organizat ion. let us con-
sider the example of Toyota1 . Under the leadership of Ono Taichi , Toyota 
achieved higher productivity than the other major car manufacturers with ini-
tially lower levels of output. This was not achieved thro.ugh investment in. more 
1 A detailed history of the Toyota car company, including the results mentioned here, can 
be found in Cusumano(l985). 
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modern machines or by higher specialization but by more careful organization 
of the production process. As the following examples illustrate , on careful ex-
amination, many of the improvements in the production process were contrary 
to much received economic wisdom. 
The introduction of the Kanban system reduces waste inventory in the pro-
duction process by only producing inputs as they are required by a later stage. 
This entails smaller, more frequent production runs in the production of com-
ponents. Smaller runs reduce the returns from economies of scale, but overall 
the Kanban system is more economical through a better coordinated production 
process, waste inventory is reduced. 
The ideas on specialization and learning by doing are also turned on their 
head. Under Taichi the average number of machines operated by a worker in-
creased from one to five. Although this change caused workers to have less 
experience with any one machine , output increased because more careful orga-
nization allowed workers to concentrate on only one machine at a time even 
though each worker had a number of machines running at the same time. 
1 
From this discussion of manufacturing production we learn that many factors 
affect productivity, and that one of the more important factors is the design and 
assignment of the tasks within the process. 
Although manufacturing is of importance to economists the average econo-
mist is more interested in the general characteristics of manufacturing or produc-
tion than in the details of the design of particular manufacturing processes. The 
7 
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details are seen as being better left to engineering, operations research or engi-
neering economics. There is, however, a type of production present in all firms, 
the design of which is of great importance to economists. That production is 
the production of management. Management production typically involves the 
organization of labour (in what I call a management structure) to make decisions 
and to implement decisions through supervision,monitoring and authority. 
The production process approach to management is one of the least studied 
areas in economics, and is the topic of this thesis. 2 
The traditional neoclassical approach to the theory of the firm has been to 
assume that an individual, the entrepreneur or manager , does all the managing. 
This simple approach has lead to a wealth of results. The economics of indus-
trial organization has used this approach almost exclusively to analyze output, 
pricing and production decisions under different market conditions. The incen-
tives literature has looked at the type of contractual relations between owner 
and managers ( corporate governance), and owners and workers (principal-agent 
and incomplete contracts). 
There have been a number of theories developed to explain the existence 
of management structures, which are also called administrative bureaucracies 
or hierarchies. It is something of a folk theorem that bounded rationality is 
necessary for a theory of management or administration. _ In the broadest sense 
2The relationship between organization and decision making has not gone unnoticed. Cyert 
and March(1963) and Marschak and Radner(1972) being two classic works on the subject. 
8 
i 
I 
\ 
bounded rationality means there are limits on the ability of individuals to deal 
with information. The necessity of modeling bounded rationality and the inter-
relationships between individuals has made the modelling of management or 
administration difficult and has led, despite a great deal of interest, to a lack of 
research. 
There are a number of types of bounded rationality which differ in the ap-
proach they imply ( the taxonomy used here was originally proposed by Rad-
ner(l 996) ). One useful distinction is between resource-based bounded rational-
ity and deciding-how-to-decide bounded rationality. Resource-based bounded 
rationality acknowledges that the acquisition or processing of information takes 
time and requires resources. The simplest example is incurring a cost in acquir-
ing information. More significant applications are to monitoring and information 
processing. 
Monitoring is essentially trying to pay attention to a number of signals avail-
able at the same time. Because an individual has limited attention she can only 
concentrate on one thing at a time and hence can only monitor one person at any 
I 
given instant. Thus increasing the number of people supervised decreases the 
attention paid to any one supervisee. This problem can be mitigated by hiring 
other managers to share the task of monitoring, but these managers will in turn 
need to be monitored. This approach gives arise to a management structure for 
supervision and is the basis for the work in chapter 5. 
Information processing bounded rationality assumes that decisions are made 
9 
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on the basis of information, that it takes time to process a piece of information 
and that it is important to make decisions in a timely manner. In this case, it 
may be possible to make a decision more quickly ( and hence more profitably) 
by splitting it into a number of subtasks handled concurrently by a number of 
people. This gives rise to a management structure for making decisions. This 
approach, pioneered by Radner and Van Zandt , forms the basis for chapters 2-4. 
; 
The solution of resource-based bounded rationality problems can be handled 
by the application of the appropriate constrained optimization technique. This 
can be a technically demanding exercise but does not entail any major conceptual 
difficulties. Deciding-how-to-decide bounded rationality is a much deeper issue. 
If people are limited in their ability to deal with information, the models of the 
world they use may be simpler than reality (in some critical sense) and their 
decision making techniques less than fully optimal. This point of view is most 
strongly associated with the name of Herbert Simon. This issue seems vitally 
important to many areas of economics, especially in the theory of organizations . 
No widely accepted, operational solution has yet been proposed and further 
consideration of this problem lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
1.2 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of four papers, chapters 2 to 5, and a concluding chapter 6. 
In these papers the subject of management structures is considered from three 
10 
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different perspectives. In chapter 2, we examine efficient information processing 
structures in an abstract setting without regard to the details of factor and 
product markets for the firm. The relationships between management structures 
and these two markets are considered in the other papers. 
We discuss , in chapter 2, the Radner Van Zandt model of information process-
ing which is the basis for the rest of that chapter, and for chapters 3 and 4. The 
first half of chapter 2 presents an improvement to the representation of labour 
cost in the information processing model so that it reflects the total amount of 
time spent working rather than just the number of people working. Using this 
new measure of labour cost, it is shown, somewhat surprisingly, that the set of 
efficient hierarchies remains the same. ,, 
In the second half of chapter 2, we attempt to incorporate ideas about human 
fallibility into the information processing model. Two types of fallibility are 
considered: errors which produce the wrong conclusion and errors that produce 
extra delay in decision making. Both types of fallibility enter into the firm's loss 
function in a lexicographic fashion and are used to give a sharper characterization 
i 
of efficient hierarchies. 
In chapters 3 and 4 we apply information processing hierarchies to a concrete 
problem in industrial organization. The problem considered is a monopolist 
choosing the characteristics for a new product to be launched into · a market 
where consumer preferences change over time, according to a stochastic process , 
and are not directly observable. 
11 
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The firm can perform market research but must process the results received 
in order to reach a decision. Using more information gives a better picture of 
the market at the time the market research was conducted. However, increasing 
the amount of information used also increases the time taken to make a decision, 
and market conditions change. Thus the firm chooses the optimal quantity of 
information and the hierarchy with which to process it jointly, by trading off the 
r 
advantages of a better historical picture and a faster decision. 
A simple model with a fixed price and a simple set of hierarchies is consid-
ered in chapter 3. The analysis is extended to a variable price model , with no 
constraint on the set of hierarchies, in chapter 4. 
In the final paper , chapter 5, we focus on the labour market and examine the 
connection between hierarchies and wages. The paper first surveys the theoreti-
cal literature on supervision in hierarchies, known as the grand contract model. 
Although this literature is well known to those who work on hierarchies , it is not 
so well known in the labour literature, despite its relevance to the new jobs-based 
approach of Lazear(1995) and Baker et al(1995). The survey suggests a number 
of conjectures deserving empirical testing. This empirical analysis is performed 
on a unique Australian data set which includes human capital variables and vari-
ables on hierarchical position. The results indicate that both traditional human 
capital and newer institutional factors are important in wage determination. In 
particular, the new results show that height in a firm's hierarchy and the nature 
of the firm are both significant determinants of wages. 
12 
Chapter 6 concludes and indicates areas of future research. 
1.3 Defining Hierarchies 
The modeling of management structures in this thesis requires explicit specifi.ca-
tion of the relationships which connect people, for example, passing information 
to another manager or being monitored by a supervisor. Such structural relation-
ships are described mathematically by graph theory. Luckily, only hierarchies 
need to be considered for the analysis in the following chapters, rather than more 
general graphs. A familiarity with definitions of various types of hierarchies is 
assumed in the main text. I provide here definitions for those readers unfamiliar 
with graph theory. 
A graph G = { N, E} consists of a set N of nodes and a set E of edges. The 
nodes represent the items of interest, in this case people, the edges represent 
the relationships between the nodes. An edge e is a pair such as ( a, b) where 
a, b E N. Note that there does not have to be an edge between all nodes. 
1 
To see how a graph can represent a simple relationship between people con-
sider the following simple example. There are four people a, b, c and d; these will 
be the nodes of the graph. Let there be a relationship of trust between a and b, 
band c, c and a and between band d. The trust relationship can be represented 
graphically by drawing a line between any two people who trust each other. ·The 
resulting graph is shown in Figure 1.1. 
13 
r 
\ 
b 
a 
C 
Figure 1.1: A simple graph 
A graph is said to be connected if for all y , z E N there exists a series of 
edges such that (y,x1 ) (x1 ,x2 ) ... (xn- l ,xn ) (xn,z). A cycle in a graph is a series 
of edges (y, x 1 ) (x1 , x 2 ) ... (xn-l, Xn) (xn, y) such that each of the x/s is distinct. 
An example of a cycle is (a, b) (b, c) (c , a) in Figure 1.1. A connected graph with 
no cycles is called a tree. A hierarchy is a rooted tree. A rooted tree is just a tree 
with one particular node identified as the root. In the context of management 
structures the root of a hierarchy will be the boss or owner. Examples of a tree 
and a hierarchy are given in Figure 1.2. 
For each node y, except the root r, in a hierarchy there is a unique series 
of edges , (r, x1 ) (x1 , x2) ... (xn-l, Xn) (xn , y) , between y and the root. This fact 
generates two natural relations on a hierarchy, the inferior and superior relations. 
We say x is superior to y if x is a node in the series of edges that connects y to 
14 
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r . y is inferior to x if and only if x is superior to y. If x is superior to y we will 
1 ,ft en say x is y's superior or y is x's subordinate or inferior. The inclusion of 
the word immediate ( or direct) in any of these relations means that the relation 
Jlds between x and y, and that there is an edge between x and y. For example, 
' is an immediate subordinate of x if y is inferior to x and the edge (x, y) is in 
the hierarchy. The root is superior to all nodes in the hierarchy. The number of 
,, 
1....irect subordinates of a node x is called x's span of control, or, more simply, its 
.cvan. 
(a) a tree (b) a hierarchy 
Figure 1.2: Examples of trees and hierarchies. 
A leaf in a hierarchy is any node that has no inferiors. The level of a node x, 
is the maximum distance between x and any leaf inferior to x. Thus all leaves 
are at level 0. The height of a hierarchy is the level of the root. 
The following regularity properties that a hierarchy can have are used else-
15 
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where in the thesis: 3 
1. A hierarchy has no skip-level reporting if each immediate subordinate of 
any node at level l is in level l - l. 
2. A hierarchy is completely balanced if it has no skip level report ing and if 
all the nodes in the same level have the same span. Completely balanced 
hierarchies are fully parameterized by the spans of the tiers and the height 
of the hierarchy. 
3. A hierarchy is completely uniform if it has no skip level reporting and if all 
the non leaf nodes have the same span. Completely uniform hierarchies 
are fully parameterized by the height of the hierarchy or the common span 
of the managers. 
Examples of hierarchies with these properties are given in Figure 1.3. 
3These definitions are from Van Zandt(1996b) 
16 
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A hierarchy with skip-level 
reporting 
A balanced hierarchy 
which is not uniform. 
A hierarchy with no skip-level 
reporting which is not balanced 
A uniform hierarchy 
Figure 1.3: Regularity properties of hierarchies 
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Chapter 2 
Inforn1ation Processing 
Hierarchies 
/ 
2.1 Introduction 
The business world is frequently battered by waves of new management theories. 
Two very influential recent management theories have been re-engineering and 
contracting out. The motivation for these theories is that significant managerial 
1 
inefficiencies can be overcome by reorganization. This raises the economically 
interesting question of what causes these inefficiencies to arise? 
Inefficiency could arise solely as the result of employing more labor than 
is actually needed. Abstracting from incentive issues in this case, inefficiency 
would be eliminated by paying people only for the work needed ( a piece-rate 
type regime) as opposed to all the time they are at work ( a salary regime). 
18 
Costly waste labor would be eliminated and there would be no need to consider 
the shape of the management structure. 
Re-engineering, however, is generally characterized by both downsizing and 
radical reorganization of the management structure. Implicitly at least, there is 
an assertion that gains exist from improving managerial structure as well. This 
is particularly clear in the debate over out-sourcing of government management 
activities. Beside the gains from only paying for required activities, there is also 
an assertion that the organizational structure will be more efficient, in some way, 
in a successful consultancy firm than in the government. 
It seems natural to assume that being able to employ people for a few hours 
where needed would open up new organizational possibilities compared with the 
situation where people are employed at a fixed cost regardless of how much they 
work. For example consider a managerial bottleneck where on rare occasions 
one manager receives a large number of reports at the same time, but has an 
easy work load otherwise. It may not be worth hiring a new salaried employee 
to assist with this rare occurrence but moving to piece-rates could make such a 
reorganization of tasks profitable. 
In order to consider these task assignment and hierarchical design rnsues, 
an economic framework is needed which is sufficiently general as to apply to a 
large number of situations, but will still correspond to some common, readily 
identifiable, management task. The information processing model pioneered in 
the work of Radner(l993) , Radner and Van Zandt(l992) and Van Zandt(l995a) 
19 
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is used here as the basis for such a framework. 1 Working with information is a 
major area of employment in the economies of the developed world. Baumol et 
al.(1989), Gittleman and Wolfe(1995) and Radner(1992) all put the fraction of 
information or data workers in the U.S. economy at over 40% of those employed. 
Hence the information processing approach has wide application. 
In this chapter, the employment side of the information processing model 
1s extended to include piece-rate and salary regimes to address the following 
question: does changing the employment regime change the set of efficient man-
agement structures or just alter the cost? Surprisingly, it is found that for non 
routine decisions, the set of efficient management hierarchies is equivalent under 
differing employment regimes. ,, Piece-rate regimes are superior in that they pay 
for fewer hours, not because they allow more efficient structures for dealing with 
information. 
For example, consider a large manufacturing firm which periodically opens 
new plants . . Should the firm have an in house department to decide on the type, 
location and size of each new plant or hire consultants for each project? It will 
i 
be shown here that the set of efficient organizational structures is independent 
of the employment regime. Thus in choosing in house or out-sourcing the only 
differences the firm needs to consider are those that apply to incentives and 
1The models of Bolton and Dewatripont(l994) and Keren and Levhari(l979, 1983, 1989) 
are closely related to the Radner-Van Zandt framework. See Van Zandt(l997b) for a discussion 
on the relationship between these models. 
20 
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employment. Both alternatives will have the same set of potential management 
structures available to them. 
Interestingly, changing the employment regime alters the returns to scale 
in information processing. In a piece-rate regime constant returns to scale are 
found for a linear loss function in contrast to decreasing returns to scale in 
Radner(1993). 
The above results require analysis of the individual tasks people perform. 
This analysis is also used to extend information processing theory in a new di-
rection. In the traditional information processing models people are completely 
reliable in the performance of an information processing task. That is , for a given 
set of inputs they will always produce the unique correct answer in a specified 
amount of time. This approach conflicts with other approaches to organizations 
such as the principal-agent model, where it is explicitly assumed that an agen-
t's productivity is not directly observable. Two possibilities for the less than 
perfect performance of a task are considered: incorrectly processing information 
( error reliability) and being late in reporting the processed result ( time reliabil-
ity). In keeping with the current information processing literature, the affect of 
task assignment ( shape of the hierarchy) on these reliabilities is considered. The 
relationship between reliability and task assignment is developed axiomatically 
from two well known management theory proverbs. Finally, this relationship is 
used to reduce the multiplicity of efficient hierarchies. 
The two reliability concepts are quite natural and could readily be described 
21 
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as the result of either skill or effort, both of which suggest the consideration of 
incentives ( wages are at present treated as a parameter). The concept of reliabil-
ities provides a framework for future research into a synthesis of incentives and 
information processing. 
2.2 Management Structures for the One Shot 
Mode 
2.2.1 The Decision Making Process 
Decision making can occur in many ways within an organization. It is generally 
,; 
based on information. Agents typically use two kinds of information in the 
decision making process: their own accumulated knowledge which has been 
learned from their experiences and new or previously unknown data. Information 
in the following analysis and discussion will refer to this second data type. 2 
This chapter focuses on how an organization takes new ( and implicitly useful) 
i 
information and uses it to make a decision. By making the organization the unit 
of analysis in the decision making process we are choosing to analyze decisions 
in which , potentially at least, a number of people can play a role. The number 
of people involved in a decision is endogenously determined given the quantity 
2 Although it is probably essential to have some prior knowledge of how the world works in 
order to be able to deal with new data, the accumulation and refinement of knowledge/skills 
is not the concern of this paper. 
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of information and the costs associated with decision making. 
A number of people can be involved in a decision in two ways, either using 
the information collectively or separately. If they use it separately, then each 
person uses all the information to draw a conclusion. The final decision is then 
made by comparing the different conclusions , see Sah and Stiglitz(1986). There 
is no point in this arrangement unless different agents are going to draw different 
conclusions from the same information. This implies that either the process for 
using the information is non algorithmic in a way that precludes communicating 
the decision making procedure to another person, or there is some stochastic 
element to the algorithm. The first situation is observed in the real world when 
a group of people make a subjective decision such as which film to buy or which 
books to publish. The second situation is observed when people double check 
each others ' work. 
If the information is used collectively then the information is shared out and 
people work on separate parts of the decision, combining their partial conclu-
sions into a decision. This aspect of decision making is commonly observed in 
organizations, where subordinates summarize data and write recommendations 
on aspects of a decision for the boss who in turn, weighs up the various reports 
in order to make the final decision. 
This second, more common, type of decision making process is the one we 
shall consider here. In order to model this process we now make some of these 
decision making concepts more concrete. 
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We assume that the decision is a function of the information received. Thus 
the process of making the decision is analogous to the process of computing the 
value of the function. In order for the tasks in the decision making process to 
be spread amongst different people, it must be the case that the overall function 
is separable in some way. This is modeled here by assuming that the decision 
can be reached by adding in one extra piece of information at a time and that 
any splitting of the information into subsets to be dealt with by separate people, 
has no effect on the outcome. These can be expressed formally by the following 
assumptions. 
Information: Information is in discrete units, for example observations on 
., 
stochastic processes such as weekly sales of different products by a retailer. 
A cohort consists of N units which arrive together to be processed to make 
one decision. The information set is all the information used, which may 
consist of many cohorts. 
Separability: The decision is made by an associative binary operation. 
There is no reason to presume that these assumptions constrain this model 
to only simple, trivial calculations. For example choosing the maximum or min-
imum from a finite set is a binary associative operation, as is pattern matching. 
These are two common paradigms for describing decision making in an orga-
nization. Another example is estimating a distribution from a random sample. 
The separability assumption could be weakened to include other classes of de-
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cision functions. However there is no obvious direction in which to expand the 
description of decision functions since at present there is no underlying economic 
theory of the properties of decision functions. 
The discussion at the start of this section indicates why separable decision 
problems are of interest. It does not indicate why we should ever expect to see 
the sharing of the decision making process amongst individuals. This occurs 
because processing information to make a decision takes time , and time is an 
important factor in the profitability of decision making. Sharing information 
between people allows them to work concurrently on different bits of the decision, 
reducing the total amount 9f time taken. 
The assumption, that processing information takes time , is a very weak form 
of bounded rationality. Unlike the machine game literature (see Osborne and 
Rubinstein(1994, chapter 9)) it is not an assumption that people behave like 
automata. The only constraint placed on intelligence is that the information 
processing to be performed is sufficiently complex as to require a discernible 
amount of time. This amount is standardized to be one period of time per unit 
of information. 
Although necessary for the analysis that follows , the assumption that infor-
mation cannot be assimilated instantaneously is a plausible description of human 
decision making, as the following simple example shows. Consider an individual 
reading reports on investment opportunities in six different countries, in order 
to choose one in which to invest. For this individual, like everyone else, it will 
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take a non zero amount of time to read each report. 
If we assume that it takes one unit of time, say an hour , to read each report 
then we can reduce the total amount of time taken to make the decision by 
splitting the task between two people. In the original situation it took one 
person six hours to read all six reports and to decide which country is most 
suitable. If the two people start work together and each one reads three reports 
then it takes three hours to find the best country in each subset. The second 
person then hands the report for the best country in the second subset to the 
first person. The first person then takes another hour to read this report and 
to decide if this country is better than the best country from their subset of 
reports. The best country is then found in four hours instead of six. Sharing 
the processing so that work can be done concurrently reduces the time taken 
to make a decision. If we think of the reports being about movements in the 
exchange rates for a set of currencies, then the importance of making a quick 
decision becomes obvious. 
The time element is captured explicitly here by assuming that individuals 
in the organization are modeled as processors. A processor has an in-box and 
a register ( which together comprise its memory). Let f ( x, y) be the binary 
associative function being used for this decision and let y be the contents of the 
processors register. Then in one period of time a processor can take one piece 
of information, x, from its in-box, perform f (x, y) and store the result in its 
register. It can then write the contents of its register ( called a report) to the 
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in-box of any processor to which it is connected. A decision is made by the 
hierarchy when the contents of a processor's register are outputed rather then 
being written to another processor. Together processors and connections form a 
network. A program specifies when each processor writes to another and when 
a decision is made. Initially all registers are set to zero and the information is 
assigned to some of the in-boxes. 
In the following, only networks which correctly process all the information 
assigned to them in finite time will be considered. 
A processor is only a partial description of a person, only those features 
pertinent to information processing are considered. This is analogous to the 
situation in principal-agent theory where only those aspects of the agent rel-
evant to incentive considerations are modeled. Thus just as a principal-agent 
model doesn't indicate how to organize a firm to produce decisions quickly, the 
information processing model doesn't indicate what the employment contract 
should be. A complete theory of organization needs to integrate at least these 
two approaches. 
It might seem that these processors are much less intelligent than real people, 
this is not the case. As discussed above, taking time to deal with information is 
certainly a human characteristic, in fact the normalization of only one calcula-
tion per period does not preclude processors actually being faster than people. 
In order to actually construct networks to make decisions, the binary associative 
operation must be algorithmic, see Meagher(1996). That extra requirement is 
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not binding here since the actual method a processor uses to perform the func-
tional evaluation of J is not considered here. This leaves only the algorithmic 
way in which information is transferred and new information is "read in". The 
original model of Radner and Van Zandt can be extended to include communica-
tion costs (see Bolton and Dewatripont(l995)), this extension is not considered 
here . As always the appropriateness of the assumptions made here is a matter 
for empirical testing. 
,, 
Figure 2.1: A 3 level hi er achy using 11 processors on 40 pieces of information 
with a delay of 11 cycles. 
Figure 2.1 shows a hierarchy with 11 processors (represented by the circles). 
The lines between the processors indicate connections which are used to pass 
information. A triangle indicates a group of raw data that a processor is dealing 
with. The number in the triangle indicates the number of pieces of informa-
tion, in this case 5. For the purpose of this example we shall assume that the 
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information set contains only one cohort (this is known as the one shot mode). 
We will be concerned primarily with hierarchies. A network is a hierarchy 
if it contains no circuits (cycles). A circuit/ cycle is a series of connections 
which, starting at a processor, lead back to that processor. For convenience and 
precision the following definition of levels in a hierarchy will be used throughout 
the chapter. 
Definition 1 If a processor has subordinates then the level of the processor is 
one greater than the maximum level amongst its subordinates. If a processor has 
no subordinates then it is at level one. 
In Figure 2.1 the information is processed as follows. Working at the same 
time the processors at level 1 each take 5 periods to read in and process their 
assigned raw data. At the end of the fifth period each of these processors sends 
the result of its calculation to its superior at level 2. Hence each processor at 
level 2 processes 2 pieces of information which takes another 2 periods. Thus 
at the end of the seventh period each level 2 processor passes its output to its 
supervisor at level 3. Similarly for level 3 and 4, except at the end of the eleventh 
period the processor at the top of the hierarchy does not pass on the results of 
a calculation, but rather produces a decision based on all the information it has 
received. Hence this hierarchy takes 11 periods to produce a decision based on 
40 pieces of information using 15 people. 
Processor activity can be represented diagrammatically with an activity dia-
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Figure 2.2: Activity diagram for the binary hierarchy of Figure 1. 
gram, see Figure 2. 2. There is a line for each period of time in which a processor 
is active (working). The arrows indicate the passing of information by proces-
sors. Generally information is passed to another processor , however for the 
processor at the top of the hierarchy this represents making a decision. 
2.2.2 The Information Set 
The example from the previous section demonstrated how an information process-
ing hierarchy made a decision on one cohort of information. This is. called the 
one shot mode. 
Multiple cohorts of data are also of interest. Without relaxing the assumption 
that one decision is to be made based on each cohort, multiple cohorts gives rise 
to a complex environment. The most general case is that v cohorts arrive in any 
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one period ( v stochastic) and that the costs associated with processing ( defined 
in the following section) are particular to each cohort. A solution to this problem 
is beyond the scope of current theory for all but the piece-rate regime, which 
is discussed in section 2.3.2. However the systolic mode , an interesting special 
case, has been solved. In the systolic mode one cohort arrives every T periods 
( this is also referred to as periodic computation). For discussion and solution of 
this problem see Radner(1993) and Van Zandt(1997c). 
The goal of this chapter is to enrich the description of processors in these 
models by making their payment more economically meaningful and by allowing 
them to be stochastic in the performance of their tasks. Given this goal the one 
shot mode is considered because the exposition of the definitions and theory in 
sections 2.3 and 2.5 is much clearer. 
2.3 Efficiency of Management Structures 
In order to determine the efficiency of a management structure there must be 
measures of the cost and performance of the structure. Section 2.3.1 defines 
these measures , shows how they can be calculated and gives a definition of 
efficiency based upon them. Section 2.3.2 examines the relationships between 
efficient hierarchies under different employment regimes. 
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2.3.1 Costs in Decision Making 
The progra1nmed network model allows the calculation of the relationship be-
tween the number of people, the time taken to make a decision (referred to as 
delay), and the amount of information used in making the decision. From this 
information a production set can be generated. For details of this see Rad-
ner(1993). 
Applying the profit maximization methodology, the optimal management 
structure for a certain situation would be the one giving the highest expected 
profit. However to determine profitability, the management structures need to 
be operating in a specific market environment, for example see Meagher(1996). 
A more general approach is to use a loss function to describe the costs associated 
with a management structure and the decision it makes. Interest has centered 
around the trade off between the number of people P and the delay C. Hence 
the use of the linear loss function of Radner(1993) shown in equation 2.1 
L = AC+¢P. (2.1) 
Loss, L, for a fixed N comprises of a total labor cost ¢P and a cost due to 
delay AC. The appropriateness, or otherwise, of the linearity of the delay cost 
depends on the decision problem and some alternative formulations are discussed 
in Radner ( 1993) . 
The contribution of this chapter is not to analyze further the cost of delay, 
but rather to reformulate the labor cost term in a more economically meaningful 
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way. As it stands the cost of labor is a fixed cost per person, independent of the 
amount of time each person is employed. 
It could be argued that ¢ is just a lump sum payment, equivalent to some 
effective per period wage We multiplied by C the number of periods it takes to 
make the decision. However C varies between different management structures , 
so that W e would have to vary inversely with C in order to keep </> constant. 
Fortunately, the detailed construction of this model provides all the time 
related information needed to build a realistic labor cost term. The programmed 
network model does not imply a labor market, hence employment regimes (the 
number of periods a person gets paid for) are taken as exogenous. 
The measure of the labor input ( which is analogous to hours), H, for a 
given network depends on the employment regime ( expressed by the function 
H(regime)). We consider the following three regimes: 
• The salary regime, where each of the P processors is employed for the 
duration of information processing. In the one shot mode that is C periods, 
hence H(salary) = GP, (where C is the delay in periods between the start 
of the information processing and the output of a decision). 
• The processor regime of Radner(1993) , where H(processor) = P. 
• The contract/piece-rate regime, where processors are only employed for 
the periods in which they are active. I show in (Lemma 6) that for an 
efficient one shot network under piece-rates H(piece - rate) = N + P - l. 
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Figure 2.3: The labour input for the hierarchy in Figure 1. can be represented 
as areas on the activity diagram. ( a) The contract/piece-rate regime. (b) The 
salary regime. 
The contract/piece-rate and salary regimes have intuitive graphical interpre-
tations in the activity diagram. Consider again the example hierarchy of Figure 
2.1 and its activity diagram, shown in Figure 2.2. Under the contract/piece-
rate regime the firm pays for the total number of active periods , that is the 
total number of periods of work done. The number of work periods is found 
by changing each line on the activity diagram to a bar of width one and then 
summing the areas. This is applied to the binary hierarchy example in Figure 
2.3(a) , where the total area, and hence the total labor input , is 54. 
Under the salary regime the firm has to pay each individual for the entire 
duration of the process, which gives a labor input of C P for the one shot mode. 
This comes to 11 X 15 = 165, which is the shaded area s_hown in Figure 2.3(b) . 
The salary regime is most intuitively plausible under multiple cohort situations. 
Consider for example the systolic mode. Institutional reasons may preclude 
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hiring people to work intermittently under the piece rate regime, thus the firm 
will end up paying for periods of idleness. It will then become important to 
attempt to organize information processing to reduce idleness per cohort below 
that associated with the one shot mode. Similarly high contracting costs or 
uncertainty about the supply of processors may cause a firm to choose to employ 
people even when they are idle between cohorts. 
Clearly there can be significant differences in the quantity of labor employed 
under the different regimes. The importance of considering mc,re than just the 
number of processors in describing the labor input was independently observed 
in Van Zandt(1997c) and Meagher(1996).3 
Before any results are derived a few more definitions are needed. 
For a particular regime let w (regime) denote the wage or payment to each 
unit of labor ( as measured by H (regime)). 
Also assume that the loss function L( H (regime), C) is linear 
L = w(regime)H(regime) + AC (2.2) 
where ,,\ is the loss/ cost per extra period of delay. 
3This paper focuses on the one shot mode, the solution of the multiple cohort problem 
under piece-rates and stochastic performance (reliabilities) to reduce the multiplicity of equi-
libria in these situations. Van Zandt(l997c) develops this framework in a complimentary, 
direction, extending the analysis of fully reliable processors by applying a salary type regime 
to periodic computation. In order to model networks that perform periodic computati~n Van 
Zandt(l997c) is much more detailed in his description of communication, leading to a more 
complex but still deterministic description of a processor. 
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Definition 2 The quartet (N, H(·), C, regime) denotes the performance of a 
network. 
Definition 3 A network ((N, H(,), C, regime) quartet) is efficient if for a given 
quantity of information N, and a given employment regime, it is not possible to 
decrease H ( ·) without increasing C, or vice versa. 
, -Radner(1993) includes a formula which gives the minimum C ( denoted C) 
and a method for finding the network ( the method in fact gives a hierarchy) 
-with that C, for a given N and P. The formula is 
8= l~J +flog2(P+NmodP)l. (2.3) 
2.3.2 Equivalence of Efficient Sets 
The following theorem establishes the surprising result that the sets of efficient 
quartets under a number of employment regimes are unique. This contradicts the 
intuition that organizations would be more efficient if people could be employed 
for odd hours, where needed, instead of in large continuous blocks. 
Theorem 4 For the one shot mode: 
( a) The quartet (N, P, C , processor) is efficient if and only if 
(N, N + P - l, C, piece - rate) is efficient. 
(b) If (N, PC, C, salary) is efficient then (N, P, C, processor) is efficient. 
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(c) If (N, P, C, processor) is efficient and there does not exist C' and P' 
such that PC = P' C', C' < C and (N, P', C' , processor) is efficient, then 
(N, PC, C, salary) is efficient. 
This theorem is proved at the end of the current section. 
Van Zandt(1995a) also considers the relationship between efficiency under 
the processor regime and under the piece-rate regime for th~ one shot mode 
(although not the salary regime). Although related, the statement of the result 
and the proofs are different . The fundamental difference in approach is that 
here the results are based directly on the performance of the networks ( the 
quartets), while in Van Zandt(1995a) the execution of tasks and the details of 
communication are emphasized, (leading to more detailed and involved proofs). 
It is not possible to be more precise without restating the Van Zandt model. 
Intuitively the Van Zandt framework necessitates the explicit consideration of 
networks which contain the redundant passing of messages. These are efficient 
under the processor regime but not under the piece-rate regime. These extra 
connections can also allow non hierarchical networks to be efficient 1under the 
processor regime. These problems are neatly circumvented here by considering 
the relationships between the efficient quartets under the different regimes rather 
than considering specific hierarchies. Corollary 5 then relates the results efficient 
quartets back to hierarchies that achieve them. 
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Corollary 5 An efficient quartet, under any of the employment regimes, can be 
achieved by a hierarchy. 
Proof. 
It follows from the construction of hierarchies in the proofs of the three parts 
of Theorem 4 that the one shot efficient hierarchies of Radner(1993) are efficient 
under all three regimes. • 
Theorem 4 says that regardless of the regime under which people are em-
ployed, the set of efficient ways in which to organize them in the one shot mode 
is in general the same.4 That is, there can be no gains in efficiency from being 
able to employ someone for just a couple of periods as opposed to having to em-
ploy them at the same cost as everyone else. The piece-rate regime hierarchies 
will always pay for less periods of work than the salary regime hierarchies but 
this is the only gain - the organizational technology is the same. 
The proof of Theorem 4 is rather involved and is left for the interested reader 
until the end of this section. The intuition however comes from the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 6 If all processors except the top processor write exactly one subtotal 
to another processor then H (piece - rate) = N + P - l in that network, which 
is a hierarchy. 
Proof. Lemma 6. 
4 I conjecture that the extra condition in Theorem 4( c) ( on C' and P') rarely, if ever holds. 
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Each of the N pieces of information goes to only one in-box. Thus each piece 
of information is read in only once. This takes one active period per piece of 
information, that is N periods. By assumption each of the P - l processors 
below the top processor writes a subtotal once to another processor. It then 
takes one active period to read in each of these P - l subtotals. Hence we have 
H(piece - rate) =JV+ P - l. Since an output is produced by the P processors 
' 
they must all be connected into the network by the P-1 connections over which 
subtotals are passed. Hence there are only enough communication connections 
to form a hierarchy, and not enough to form any cycles. • 
For all regimes in the one shot mode, every processor receives raw data 
(Lemma 7). Hence every processor has a report to send. Lemma 6 provides a 
lower bound on the active cycles required to do this, regardless of the regime. 
Using this it can be shown that there cannot be any efficiency gains between 
regimes because this common technology underlies all the regimes. 
Lemma 7 Every processor in an efficient (N, H (.), C, piece - rate) hierarchy 
receives raw data. 
The proof of this lemma is contained in the appendix. 
Theorem 8 An efficient solution to any multiple cohort problem under the piece 
rate regime is to assign a one shot efficient hierarchy to each cohort. 
Proof. 
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By assumption there need be no interactions between processors working on 
separate cohorts. Under piece rates there are no idle periods between processing 
cohorts to m1n1mize and hence the processing of each cohort can be consid-
ered separately. Thus efficiency is obtained overall if each cohort, considered in 
isolation is processed efficiently. This is achieved by using a one shot efficient 
hierarchy to process each cohort.5 • 
The assumptions of associativity and one decision per cohort imply that 
there are no inter-relations between the processing of cohorts. That is, there is 
no need to worry about one decision being made before some other decision or 
about who is assigned to each cohort. The piece-rate regime leads to separability 
in labor cost. The labor cost of processing a cohort is just the number of active 
cycles needed to process it. There is no effect from when any other cohort arrives 
or how big it is, on the labor cost of processing a particular cohort. 
In fact there is no need for the cohorts to have the same w or A, or for the 
cohorts to be of the same size, or for the number arriving in any period to be 
known in advance since the choice of one shot efficient hierarchy for each cohort 
1s independent of the choices for all other cohorts. These very strong results 
will not hold in general if there are planning costs, or if computation needs to 
5The special case of this theorem, applying to the systolic mode, was pointed out to me 
during a conversation with Roy Radner and Tim Van Zandt in the spring of 1995 and is noted 
in Van Zandt(l996,p37) . The much more general multiple cohort case is particular to this 
paper. 
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be performed by one network, or if people have to be paid under some sort 
of salary regime. In these circumstances the decision problems will need to be 
solved jointly since there would be interactions. 
The proofs of the main results follow. 
Proof. Sufficiency of Theorem 4(a). 
Radner(1993) shows that for each efficient (N, H(.), C, processor) quartet 
there exists a hierarchy, which achieves that quartet, in which each processor 
except the top processor writes exactly one subtotal. By Lemma 6 these efficient 
( N , H (.), C, processor) hierarchies use N + P- l active periods. We now consider 
a piece-rate regime hierarchy, using N + P - l active periods to process N pieces 
of information. Any such hierarchy must use N periods to read in the raw,, data 
hence it can use at most P-1 periods for adding up subtotals. The top processor 
reads in raw data and hence has its own subtotal, to which all other subtotals 
must eventually be added. Hence there can be at most P subtotals. By Lemma 
7 each processor receives raw information and hence has its own subtotal. Thus 
there can be at most P processors. 
1 
It remains to show that an efficient (N, N + P - l, C*, piece - rate) hierar-
chy does indeed use P processors, but has the same delay as the associated 
efficient (N, H(.), C, processor) hierarchy. 
If it were possible to subdivide and add up the information using less than 
N +P-l active periods to give a delay of C* < C then the (N, H(.), C,processor) 
hierarchy could not have been efficient (since reducing the number of active pe-
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riods means reducing the maximum number of processors used below P). This 
would imply that there is some way to organize less than P processors to give a 
delay of at most C, contradicting the assumed efficiency of the (N, P, C, processor) 
hierarchy. 
If it were possible to use P processors in a (N, N + P - l, C*, piece - rate) 
hierarchy to give a delay of C* < C , then it would certainly be possible to do 
this with P processors under the processor regime because there would be no 
limit on the number of active periods used. Hence C* = C. • 
Proof. Necessity of Theorem 4(a) 
N + P - l active periods are used in an efficient (N, H(.), C,piece - rate) 
hierarchy. Rearranging, P = H - N + l. Using this P and the same N we can 
find a (N, P, C*, processor) hierarchy, where C* is the minimum delay possible 
given N and P. 
By assumption, the (N, N + P - l , C, piece - rate) hierarchy was efficient so 
C < C*. Otherwise we could construct a hierarchy from the (N, P, C*, processor) 
hierarchy, using N + P - l active periods but having shorter delay. 
Also C > C* otherwise we could construct a hierarchy from the 
(N, N + P - l, C,piece - rate) hierarchy which would use P processors but hav-
ing a shorter delay than C*, violating the choice of (N, P, C*, processor) as a 
hierarchy with minimum delay for the given N and P. 
Sine€ C = C* it follows that there is no (N, P*, C, processor) hierarchy where 
P* < P , because such a hierarchy would use less than the N + P- l active periods 
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to give a delay of C violating the assumption of (N, N + P - l, C, piece - rate) 
as an efficient hierarchy. • 
Proof. Theorem 4(b) 
Dividing the labor cost H( salary) = PC by C gives the number of processors 
used. The proof then proceeds as in the proof of Theorem 4(a), to show that by 
efficiency, P and C are the same under both measures of labor input. • 
Proof. Theorem 4(c) 
By assumption there is no other processor efficient hierarchy with the same 
labor input under the salary regime as (N, P, C, processor) which has a lower 
delay. Applying arguments similar to those used in the proof of part (a) of this 
theorem, there cannot be a salary efficient hierarchy having both a lower input ,, 
and a lower delay than (N, P, C, processor) , under the salary regime. If such a 
hierarchy did exist we could use it to construct an efficient processor hierarchy 
using less processors and incurring less delay than (N, P, C, processor). This 
would violate the assumption that (N, P, C, processor) is an efficient proces-
sor hierarchy. Thus under the salary regime (N, P, C, processor) is an efficient 
hierarchy.• 
Having examined the efficiency of one shot hierarchies under the vanous 
regimes we now proceed to consider the choice of hierarchy. 
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2.4 Efficient Hierarchies and the Efficient Fron-
tier 
We now examine the characteristics of efficient hierarchies under the differing 
employment regimes. Section 4.1 makes comparisons between the efficient fron-
tiers in a manner similar to the standard isoquant-isocost framework. Section 
. 
4.2 uses the new results on hours to see how hours worked grows relative to 
numbers of people employed as the quantity of information grows , and hence to 
examine the returns to scale. 
2.4.1 Non Convexity of the Efficient Set. 
Figure 2.4 shows the efficient frontiers for the salary and piece rate regimes 
for the case N = 40. This shows the standard relationship between the two 
frontiers. They touch when the hierarchy has one processor and the piece rate 
regime frontier is below the salary regime in all other cases. Thus given the 
same effective per period wage and cost of delay, the piece rate regime with the 
same number of employees is always no more expensive than the corresponding 
salary regime, and the piece rate regime will be strictly cheaper for sufficiently 
many employees. 
Comparing the preferred efficient piece rate regime hierarchy to the preferred 
salary regime hierarchy ( assuming effective per period cost are the same) we 
observe more people are employed, with a lower average total income in a faster 
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acting organization than under the salary regime. 
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Figure 2.4: Efficient frontiers for salary and piece-rate regimes 
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Since the efficient frontier of performance quartets consists of only points it 
is possible that more than one quartet minimizes a given loss function. In which 
case one of the refinements from Section 5 can be applied to select a unique 
point. 
The underlying non convexity of the relationship between P and N for effi-
1 
cient hierarchies that Radner(1993) observes carries over to the piece-rate and 
salary regimes. In fact the salary regime is very non convex in some regions. 
The non convexity occurs near quartets with the smallest delay. Technically this 
implies that in this region small changes in relative prices could lead to large 
shifts around the frontier, with corresponding major restructuring in the hier-
archy and changes in employment. This would be difficult to test directly since 
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there are generally other costs to reorganization which produce inertia ( Carroll 
and Hannan(l989)). However, given inertia, if relative prices (>. and w) are 
variable and firms are set up at different times, then one would expect to see 
quite different organizational structures within an industry, which is frequently 
the case (Carroll and Hannan(l989)). 
2.4.2 Economies of Scale and the Growth Rate of Em-
ployment 
I now examine how H and C depend on N for efficient hierarchies under the 
salary and piece-rate regimes. This builds on the earlier work of Radner(1993) 
which analyses how H and C depend on N for the processor regime. These 
results can be interpreted as returns to scale in information processing, where 
N is the scale of the information processing. 
From Radner(1993) if N, P and ~ are large then the following approximation 
,,....._ 
holds for C ( minimum delay). 
,,....._ N 
C ~ - +log2 P p 
The loss function ( total cost) for the piece-rate regime is 
L = w(N + P - l) + >.C 
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Using the approximation in Equation 2.4 gives 
L = 
N 
w(N + P - l) + >.( p + log2 P) 
N lnP 
w(N+P-l)+>.(p + ln
2
) 
The first order condition to minimize the loss, L, for a given N is 
( N l )=o w + >. - p2 + p ln 2 
or equivalently 
2 p 
aP +- - N = 0 
ln 2 ' 
w -_ 
O'.== >.. 
Solving this quadratic for the positive root gives 
-1n\ + p = , (c1}2)2 + 4aN) 
20'. 
Thus as N increases without bound it follows 
p ~ (:r/2, C rv ( aN) i/2' HrvN 
' 
minL rv wN. 
(2.6) 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
These results indicate P and C growing at the same rate asymptotically as in 
the processor regime, see Radner(1993). However by applying the methodology 
of hours rather than heads to measure the labor input, we see that under the 
i 
piece-rate regime labor is actually increasing at the rate of N, rather than ../Fi", 
as found in Radner(1993). As a consequence total cost also grows at the higher 
rate of N, which means asymptotically constant returns to scale. 
The asymptotic behavior of the average number of periods of activity per 
person 1s 
; ~ N x (; r/2 = (aN)1/2. (2.12) 
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This leads to the empirical implication that in an information processing team, 
working on one project at a time, the average hours worked per person is of the 
order of the square root of the amount of information being considered. One 
possible real world situation in which to test this is large legal cases. In such 
cases a team sets to work on sifting through evidence in order to compile a case. 
The number of hours and the number of people ·would be recorded for billing 
purposes and the quantity of information could be approximated by the number 
of pages of evidence considered. 
2.5 Uniqueness of Equilibria 
There can fail to be a unique equilibrium hierarchy for two reasons. First non 
convexities in the efficient frontier can give rise to two or more performance quar-
tets that minimize the loss function. The second reason for the non uniqueness 
of equilibria is that the efficient performance quartet may correspond to more 
than one hierarchy. 6 The points on the efficient frontier correspond in general 
to sets of hierarchies rather than individual hierarchies. For example, Figure 2.5 
shows the four efficient hierarchies using seven processors (for N = . 7x, x E Z 
and x sufficiently large). 7 . 
6To avoid confusion we focus on piece-rate efficiency in this section. 
7There are two parts to processing information: preprocessing and overhead processing. 
During preprocessing each processor deals with the raw information it has been assigned. 
Overhead processing is the bringing together of information from the P processors. Since in-
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The existence of multiple efficient hierarchies does not invalidate any of the 
previous results since uniqueness was not implicit in any of the proofs. However, 
an actual firm must choose a specific hierarchy rather than just a performance 
quartet. Although this could be done randomly, it is more interesting and infor-
mative to consider refinements to the set of equilibria that reflect other aspects 
of the design of hierarchies. The four equilibrium refinements which I present 
here are particularly interesting because they extend the analysis to situations 
in which the performance of a processor is no longer completely reliable. 
There are many extensions to this model which would capture pertinent 
features in hierarchy design, such as standardization of tasks, tournament for 
pay setting/promotions and learning by,, doing. Instead of these we focus here 
on processors whose performance is stochastic. In particular people can either 
make mistakes in the reports they pass or can be late in passing their reports. 
Firstly, I will consider processors that can make mistakes in their information 
processing tasks. 
2.5.1 Uniform Error Reliability. 
Assume that for each processor there exists an identical probability B that the 
processor passes a report without an error ( called the reliability) , and that the 
formation is assigned evenly for preprocessing, see Radner(1993), the overhead processing can 
be considered independent of N, for sufficiently large N. The problem for overhead processing 
is how to bring information from P sources together as quickly as possible. 
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(a) (b) 
(d) 
Figure 2.5: 
realization for each processor ( whether it makes a mistake or not) is independent. 
Then for each of the efficient hierarchies in Figure 2.5 the probability that 
they compute the correct decision is 87 . Hence this refinement fails to differen-
tiate between equilibrium hierarchies with the same number of processors. This 
refinement is only useful when there is more than one efficient performance quar-
tet, in which case it selects the quartet with the smallest number of processors. 
This is a formalization of the common idea in management theory that smaller 
and hence simpler is better: " .. things need to be kept simple if the unit is truly 
to pull together." Peters and Waterman(1982,p306) 
A similar type of reliability is to attach the probabilities to the reliability 
of the messages ( a message may become garbled). In this case the intuition is 
to minimize the number of times information is passed from one processor to 
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another. Again this has no impact on a single set of efficient hierarchies, because 
efficient one shot hierarchies with the same number of processors all have the 
same number of reports being passed. Again the usefulness of this refinement is 
in distinguishing between different sets of efficient hierarchies. 
For the two reliabilities above, the stochastic extension to the description of 
the processors did not change the original design problem. However that would 
not have been the case if the probabilities had not been identical. If different 
individuals had inherent characteristics that caused them to perform differently, 
regardless of their position, then task assignment to individuals would be impor-
tant and would need to be considered in design ( an example of this in a different 
kind of hierarchy model is Rosen(l982)). This is a much more complicated prob-
lem because the distribution of characteristics has to be known before design, or 
the organizational design has to include elements for determining an individuals 
characteristics. 
The remainder of this chapter will not focus on differences in performance 
which spring from an individual's personal attributes. Instead the refinements 
I 
concentrate on how the structure in which one operates might affect one's per-
formance. The two aspects of performance to be considered are reliability and 
potential for causing delay. 
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2.5.2 Positional Error Reliability 
Consider now the case in which position in the hierarchy, and hence the tasks one 
is assigned, affect one's reliability. Let the probability that a processor correctly 
processes its inputs , B(I) E (0 , 1], be a function of I the number of information 
processing tasks the processor performs. B(I) is called a processor's primary 
reliability. One natural intuition about B ( I) is that a person is more likely to 
make a mistake if they have more things to do ( once they have learned their 
task). This intuition is modeled by assu1ning that B(I) is decreasing in I. Also 
assume that the probability of errors in processing are independent for different 
processors. 
A processor can also produce an erroneous report because it received incor-
rect reports. Thus the concepts of the overall reliability of a processor is also 
needed. Let R, the overall reliability of a processor, be the probability that the 
processors report is correct. 
Under these assumptions different hierarchies will in general have different 
overall reliabilities , even if they have the same N and P. Thus the overall 
1 
reliability of a hierarchy ( and hence of the decision it makes) should also be 
treated as a choice variable. However the loss function will be sensitive to the 
specific functional form of B ( I) , and existing information processing theory gives 
no indication of what specific form B (I) should take. 
In order to leave the loss function unchanged, we consider sequences of pri-
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mary reliability probabilities which tend to full reliability (Bn (I) = 1) in the 
limit ( n --+ oo) but fall in the interval (0, 1) otherwise. This is very similar 
to the trembling hand refinement in Game theory. This assumption makes the 
choice of equilibrium hierarchy a two step process. First choose an efficient 
quartet , then choose the most reliable hierarchy in this quartet. Besides being 
tractable this method is also attractive because it requires a weaker assumption 
about Bn (I) - it will now only be necessary to rank the reliabilities of efficient 
hierarchies with the same P. We now consider some economically meaningful 
ways in which to rank the reliabilities and the corresponding assumptions about 
the curvature of Bn ( I) . 
For a given N and P, the total number of information processing tasks across 
all processors in an efficient hierarchy is fixed at N + P - l ( see Lemma 6). Thus 
for a given N and P the maximum reliability of a one shot efficient hierarchy 
is determined by the allocation of the N + P - l information processing tasks 
across the P processors. In order to rank the reliabilities of a set of hierarchies , 
further assumptions about Bn(I) are necessary. Strict log concavity and strict 
1 
log convexity are of particular importance as Theorem 9 shows. 
Before stating the theorem the two new concepts of span dominance and 
chain dominance need to be introduced. 
As Simon(1953) observes, organizational theorists have certain proverbs about 
how to best structure hierarchies. In particular, large spans of control are bad 
and long chains of command are bad. Simon calls these proverbs because they 
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are opposite and unquantified statements. For a fixed number of people small 
spans of control necessarily imply long chains of command and vice versa. Ob-
viously a good organizational design has to find a trade off between the two , the 
proverbs offer no assistance in determining this trade-off. These two proverbs 
are formalized in the following two definitions. 
(a) Span component (b) Chain component 
Figure 2.6: 
The span and chain components, shown in Figure 2. 6, are the two smallest 
1 
hierarchies that organize the same number of people in difference ways ( there 
is only one hierarchy for one processor and only one for two processors) . If 
( everything else equal) spans perform more reliably than chains of command, 
then it must be the case that the span component in Figure 2.6(a) has a higher 
overall reliability than the chain component in Figure 2.6(b). This is ·referred 
to as span dominance. If the converse is true and chains have higher overall 
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reliability than spans, everything else equal, then chain dominance is said to 
hold. 
Intuitive as these dominance conditions are for simple hierarchies, trying to 
compare larger hierarchies by some sort of decomposition into simpler subhier-
archies is an impractical method in general. However, Theorem 9 provides a 
simple method for using the primary reliability function () to implement the 
dominance conditions. 
Two factors can cause a processor to produce an incorrect output ( to be 
unreliable), it can make an error or it can receive erroneous inputs ( one of its 
subordinates makes a mistake). By assumption, the probabilities of these two 
events are independent. Abo it is assumed that an error in processing incorrect 
inputs has probability zero of producing the correct output by accident - two 
wrongs don't make a right. Thus the probability of a processor being correct can 
be written as the product of its primary reliability times the overall reliability 
of its inputs. To express this formally, consider a processor P0 with overall 
relia~ility R0 , and I0 raw data inputs. In addition let P0 have J subordinates, 
{ P1, ... , PJ}, with respective overall reliabilities { R1, ... , RJ}. Then 
J 
Ro= ()n (Io+ J) X IJ R. (2.13) 
i=l 
Similarly, the overall reliability of P0 would just be Ro = ()n (Io) if Po had no 
subordinates. Using recursion and independence allows the overall reliability for 
a hierarchy G, ( denoted R ( G)) to be calculated directly from the primary reli-
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abilities. Let processor i = 1, .. , P, have Ii raw data inputs and si subordinates, 
then 
p 
R ( G) = II en ( Ii + Si) . (2.14) 
i = l 
Assume , for convenience , that N = 7x, so that each processor is assigned x pieces 
of data. Also let m (j) denote the number of processors with j subordinates, 
then the expression can be simplified further 
M 
R (G) = II en (x + j)m(j). (2.15) 
j = l 
Where M is the greatest number of subordinates of any processor in G. 
Equation 2.15 gives the overall reliability of a hierarchy if Bn is known. In 
general the functional form of en is not known. However Theorem 9 gives a way 
to combine Equation 2.15 and our intuition over span and chain dominance in 
order to rank the overall reliabilities. 
Theorem 9 The reliability function en is strictly log concave on z+ (strictly 
log convex on z+) if and only if chain dominance holds (span dominance holds). 
Proof. 
By Equation 2.15, the reliabilities for the span and chain components are 
en (x + 2) en (x )2 and en (x + 1 )2 en (x) respectively. 
If span dominance holds then 
en (x + 2) en (x) > en (x + 1)2 . (2.16) 
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Taking logs and dividing by 2 gives 
logBn (x + 2) + logBn (x) > logBn (x + 1) · 
2 
(2.17) 
Equation 2.17 holds if and only if log Bn ( x) is strictly log convex on z+. The 
proof for chain dominance proceeds in a similar manner . 
• 
Which of span and chain dominance is more appropriate for determining the 
reliability of a hierarchy for a given decision problem is exogenous to the analysis 
here. It would depend on the type of decision the hierarchy is making and is an 
empirical matter. 
One consequence of equation 2.15, is that different hierarchies can have the ., 
same reliabilities. This occurs because only information on the number of sub-
ordinates and raw data inputs is used, which does not fully describe the shape 
of a hierarchy. As a result this refinement cannot in general guarantee a unique 
outcome as the following example shows: span dominance to the set of four 
efficient hierarchies in Figure 2.5. 
Using equation 2.15 the reliabilities for the four hierarchies in Figure 2.5 are 
(a) Bn(x+3)Bn(x+ l) 3 Bn(x) 3 
(b) Bn(x+ 2) 2Bn(x+ 1)2Bn(x) 3 
(c) Bn(x+3)Bn(x+2)Bn(x+ l)Bn(x) 4 
(d) Bn(x+3)Bn(x+2)Bn(x+ l)Bn(x) 4 
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Notice that ( c) and ( d) have the same reliabilities under this method and hence 
this refinement will be unable to differentiate between them. 
Comparing (a) and (b), using equation 2.16 gives 
Bn(x + 2)Bn(x) > Bn(x + 1)2 
therefore 
Bn(x + 3)Bn(x + 1) > Bn(x + 2) 2 
hence 
Bn(x + 3)Bn(x + 1)3Bn(x) 3 > Bn(x + 2) 2Bn(x + 1)2Bn(x) 3 
and thus (a) is preferred to (b) under span selection. 
Similarly for ( c) and (a). 
Bn(x + 2)Bn(x) > Bn(x + 1) 2 
hence 
Bn(x+3)Bn(x+ 2)Bn(x+ l)Bn(x)4 > Bn(x+3)Bn(x+ l)3 Bn(x) 3 
giving ( c) preferred to (a). Thus span selection gives { ( c), ( d)} as the reduced set 
of equilibrium efficient hierarchies. Intuitively these are the hierarchies which 
appear to feature shorter chains of command. 
One advantage of the formalization presented above is that it provides a 
concrete method for partially ordering the hierarchies that is equally valid for 
large hierarchies where intuition is a much poorer guide than in the simple 
example presented here. 
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2.5.3 Lateness: Time Reliability 
An alternative v_iew of stochastic performance by a processor is to consider the 
possibility of lateness by a processor instead of the possibility of error. A simple 
model of lateness in production is given in Sobel(1992), where an individual can 
forget all that they have done so far and have to start again. This can give rise 
to very long, and unrealistic completion times for information processing tasks. 
The alternative I suggest, is that an individual can be one period late in passing 
their output, with probability (1 - <Pn), where again <Pn ---+ l as n ---+ oo. Similar 
to the trembling hand refinement in game theory, (1- </>n) is infinitesimal. Thus 
the probability of a processor being more than one period late is the product of 
infinitesimal numbers and is hence too small to be of concerned. Being a number 
of periods late would give no extra predictive power and would only complicate 
the model. Besides it is intuitively unlikely to give a positive probability to an 
individual being ten years late with a weekly report. In a firm an individual 
may well be late, perhaps even a number of periods, but it is implausible that 
an employee would keep their job if such a situation ran on particularly long. 
Let the probabilities that different processors are late be independent. The 
probability that more than one processor is late is again the product of infinites-
imal numbers and hence can be ignored in the analysis. Thus we only consider 
the possibility of lateness occurring at one processor in the hierarchy. 
Lateness by a processor has two possible affects. It can increase the delay 
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in making the final decision by the hierarchy and it can cause processors to 
be active for extra periods of time. Clearly if a processor is late then it must 
have worked an extra period , it will also cause processors at higher levels to 
work extra periods if they were relying on its output being made on time ( either 
directly or indirectly). We focus here on the extra periods of work because it 
gives a higher level of differentiation between hierarchies ( that is it is more likely 
to give a unique outcome). 
The maximum extra delay due to lateness is either O or 1. It will be O if at 
some point above the late processor, some other processor has inputs such that 
it can organize its activities to overcome the lateness. The extra delay will be 
1 otherwise. An example of such a rescheduling would occur if one of the single ,, 
processors ( with no subordinates) immediately below the top processor in figure 
2.5 ( c) was late. In this case there are two processors passing reports at the same 
time, thus if one is late the top processor just deals with the other first. Thus 
focusing on extra delay does not take account of the shape of a hierarchy but 
just the occurrence of this rescheduling po'ssibility at some point. 
I 
Focusing on extra periods worked captures both structural elements of the 
hierarchy and the rescheduling potential. This occurs because lateness by a 
processor will cause all processors above it to work an extra period until a 
processor with the potential to reschedule is reached. The hierarchy(s) with the 
lowest expected extra periods of work is preferred. Thus this refinement will 
favor shorter chains of command and the rescheduling potential. 
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The potential to reschedule only exists if there are some reports which are not 
immediately processed by the person receiving them. This is exactly the opposite 
of the just-in-time message condition for MS networks in Van Zandt(1997c) . 
Van Zandt uses MS networks as a characterization of a class of one shot efficient 
networks and, more importantly, as the building blocks for a class of efficient 
periodic networks. However as just observed, MS networks may not be preferred 
in a stochastic performance setting. This indicates one way in which the results 
from the existing deterministic theory of information processing networks may 
be substantially effected by considering a stochastic performance case. 
The expected extra periods of work (if only one processor is late) for the four 
hierarchies jn Figure 2.5 are ( a) (1 - ¢n) 17, (b) (1 - ¢n) 18 , ( c) (1 - ¢n) 15 and 
( d) (1 - ¢n) 12. Thus under the lateness refinement ( d) is the unique equilibrium 
hierarchy. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The major innovation of this chapter has been to use hours as well as number 
of employees in analyzing information processing hierarchies. Although this 
extension seems obvious it has not previously been made. Theorem 4 shows, 
surprisingly, that there exist equivalences between the efficient sets of hierarchies 
under the processor and piece-rate regimes. However as the remainder of the 
chapter shows, analysis at the hours level can give new insightful results. In 
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particular, constant returns to scale were shown if hours were used instead of 
employee numbers. 
The methodology of looking at individual activity is also the driving force be-
hind the refinements developed in Section 2.5. The refinements significantly in-
crease the number of situations in which unique outcomes are predicted. Unique-
ness then opens up the potential for empirical analysis of firm organizational 
charts and the decision making environment they operate in. 
Finally one of the most attractive areas of future research is in the synthe-
sis of the information processing approach with the principal agent/incentive 
literature. If incentive considerations are to be introduced in determining the 
employment contract then performance ( specifically () and ¢) should depend 
on effort in someway, and effort should be related to the number of periods 
worked. Again this will rely on the analysis of individual activity and stochastic 
performance introduced in this chapter. 
Appendix 
Proof. Lemma 7. 
Levels in a hierarchy are defined as follows. Processors with no subordinates 
are of level 1. The level of any other processor is 1 + the maximum of the levels 
of its subordinates. 
By efficiency, every level one processor receives raw information, otherwise 
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Top Processor 
Level m 
Level 1 
. . 
y 
. . . . 
Figure 2. 7: Hierarchy with raw information only received below level m. 
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it would do nothing. The result follows immediately for single level hierarchies, 
thus we now consider multiple level hierarchies. 
For the purpose of strong induction assume that all processors below level 
m > 1 receive raw data. For an example of such a hierarchy see Figure 2.7. 
Consider a level m processor y which receives input only from the processors 
{x1, ... , xk}. Such a processor, y , from Figure 2.7 is shown in Figure 2.8(a), with 
its immediate subordinates. A part or subsection of a hierarchy, such as that 
shown in Figure 2.8 (a) is referred to as a component. The timing diagrams for 
these two components are shown in Figure 2.9 (a) and (b), respectively. 
Assume without loss of generality that the subordinates of y pass their re-
ports in numerical order according to their index (x1 first, and s9 QJl). Let x1 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 2.8: (a) Original component with i1nmediate subordinates of y. (b) 
Improved component with y receiveing raw data. 
time time 
T+2 I~ T+2 1~ T+l ~ T+l ! T 1 
... T 
f T-1 T-1 
a I • a I • 
X1 y X2 X1 y X2 
(a) (b) 
Figure 2.9: Timing diagrams: ( a) for original component ; (b) for improved 
component. 
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pass its report in period T , then the earliest X2 could pass its report to y is 
period T + l , this is the case shown in Figure 2.9. The particular period after T 
in which x 2 passes its report makes no difference to the proof. The assumption 
of T + l here is purely for concreteness. 
From the timing diagram, x 1 starts processing at period a and finishes at 
period T, at which time it passes a report to y. Since by assumption y does not 
receive raw information it follows that y is inactive before receiving the subtotal 
from x 1 . Thus x 1 can be deleted and all its inputs directed to y , this new 
component is shown in Figure 2.8 (b). The information can be processed by y in 
the same time as x 1 used to take, hence y can also start at period a and finish 
the work at period T that x 1 used to perform . 
Note that x2 was the first subordinate of y to pass a report to y after x 1 . 
This report was passed at the end of T and processed by y in period T + l. 
After the transformation, y is still free at period T + l to do this so there is no 
increase in delay for the hierarchy from this change to the component. However , 
we have eliminated the active period needed to read x 1 's subtotal so the total 
labor cost of the hierarchy has decreased by one. This is shown in Figure 2.9(b) 
by the gap in activity for y at period T. Thus there exists a change which can be 
made to the original hierarchy which reduces the quantity of labor used without 
increasing the delay. Hence the old arrangement cannot have been efficient. By 
assumption x 1 received raw data so y now receives raw data as well. Hence by 
induction all processors at level m > 0 receive raw data. • 
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Chapter 3 
A Monopoly Location Problem 
with Hierarchies 
,; 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops a model of management structure and function for a firm 
which is developing a product for a predetermined launch date. The example 
which typifies the situation being considered is the development of a feature 
film. 
There are standard distribution deals for many films and in the short term the 
price that consumers pay for different films remains fixed. Hence film producers 
compete not on price but the characteristics of their films. The preferences of 
the film going public are not directly observable and change over time. However 
market research can and does influence the content of films during the production 
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process. 
This chapter attempts to address two main questions motivated by this ex-
ample. What kind of management structure should a firm in this kind of market 
adopt in order to try and maximize profits? What effects do differing manage-
ment structures have on performance? 
The product is one that can vary in its characteristics, hence the firm has 
to pick a combination of characteristics for its product which it believes will 
maximize returns. The preferences of consumers change over time and are not 
directly observable. To describe this situation a standard model of one dimen-
sional preferences is expanded to a dynamic stochastic setting where a firm 
consists of boundedly rational agents. In particular, agents are limited in the 
amount of computation they can perform in each time period. 
As a result of the stochastic nature of the problem, a firm is forced to make 
a decision on what product to produce, based on a forecast of the unknown 
market conditions at the launch date. Since the firm has no competitors it 
simply decides to locate at which ever point its forecast tells it will be the centre 
of the market when the product is launched. 
It is shown in Radner(1993) and Van Zandt(1994), that the time to calcu-
late a forecast is an increasing function of the amount of data considered and 
a decreasing, bounded function of the number of people employed in making 
the decision. By applying earlier work on hierarchies to the stated economic 
problem, this chapter has succeeded in endogenizing the cost of delay ( the time 
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taken to calculate the forecast). 
Each decision making procedure (method for producing a forecast) corre-
sponds to a different management structure and associated management func-
tion , which are modeled here as information processing hierarchies. This method-
ology allows analysis of the minimum delay incurred by a given organizational 
structure in making a decision based on a given quantity of market research. 
The principal intuition of the chapter is that increasing sample size gives a 
more accurate estimate of a historical situation, but it also increases delay, mak-
ing this estimate a more out of date basis for predicting the future. In formaliz-
ing this intuition it is also shown that the optimal size of a firm 's management 
structure depends on the speed of change that nccurs in the product market. 
The relationship between the type of product sold, organizational structure and 
expected profit is also examined. 
Section 3.2 formally defines the model which will be considered. Section 3.3 
examines the properties of the single sample case in some detail. A mixture of 
numerical and analytic techniques are used. Section 3.5 is the conclusion. 
3.2 The Formal Model 
3.2.1 The Market 
The traditional location model of differentiated products is modified to become 
a dynamic stochastic model. We begin by describing the situation during period 
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t, and then present the process by which market conditions change over time. 
Consumers derive satisfaction from the consumption of the intrinsic charac-
teristics of the goods they purchase. For convenience we assume that the good 
under consideration has one relevant characteristic, which can be represented 
by a real number. A good produced by a firm can be represented by the unique 
point x on the real line ( the real line is referred to as the characteristic space). 
For ease of exposition, a good is generally identified with the point representing 
its characteristics, so that the good itself is said to be "located" at the point on 
the real line. 
Individuals differ in their preference for characteristics. Each individual has 
a unique ideal type of good, which is also represented by a point, c, also on 
the real line. Consumers prefer products that are closer to their ideal points. 
In particular, an individual's utility from a product is strictly decreasing in 
the distance between the product and the individual in the characteristic space 
( similar to goods we refer to consumers as being located in the characteristic 
space at their ideal point). 
Individuals differ in their location and are represented as a continuum of 
consumers, whose locations are uniformly distributed over the interval [M(t) -
~' M(t)+~], referred to as the market interval. Consumers have unit demand and 
buy whichever product gives them the highest utility, which will be the closest 
product to their ideal point. They only buy if the utility from a product satisfies 
some reservation utility constraint (which would be determined exogenously by 
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outside options). 
We assume that the reservation utility level u* is the same for each consumer 
and that the utility functions are identical functions of the distance of a product 
from an individual's ideal point. The utility for a consumer with ideal point c, 
from good x is given by 
U(x, c) = V(lx - cl) (3.1) 
where V(lx - cl) is strictly decreasing in Ix - cl. Let z = x - c. 
Notice that the utility function of each individual is symmetric about that 
individual's ideal point. Much of the following could be generalized to non-
symmetric utility functions. The functional form in Equation 3.1 is used for its 
expositional ease, and because the main focus of this chapter is to elucidate the 
inter-relationship between internal information processing and market behavior 
in as general and concise a way as possible. The complexities of more specific 
functional forms may well be needed when this model is fitted to data. 
Fixing the price reduces the generality of the model in one sense but increases 
it in another. In oI;der to allow price to vary in a location model it is necessary 
to explicitly define the relationship between price and spatial component of util-
ity. Results derived from such a specification are often dependent on the exact 
functional form chosen. 1 By fixing price here , choice of a particular functional 
1 Such an example is discussed in Tirole (1988, p280-281). In the fixed location, linear cost 
model no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices exists when the firms are located sufficiently 
close to the centre of the market. However in the same model with quadratic transport costs 
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form ( such as linear transport cost) is avoided, leading to results which are more 
general. 
In the rest of the chapter we will consider a firm in isolation. The firm will 
have buyers whose ideal points satisfy V(z) > u*. Since the utility function is 
strictly decreasing and symmetric, it follows that there exists some r > 0, such 
that consumer c will only purchase good x if Ix - cl < r. Hence the potential 
customers for product x are those that lie in the closed interval [x - r, x + r], 
referred to as the product interval of appeal, or the firm 7S interval ( as opposed 
to the market interval). 
Consumers are represented by a probability distribution (with density h (c)) 
over the characteristic space. Integrating the density function over product x's 
interval of appeal will give the proportion of the total population of consumers 
who would buy product x. Since consumers are uniformly distributed on [M(t)-
i, M(t) + iJ, the proportion of consumers purchasing x (referred to as market 
share s(x, M (t), w)) is given by 
l x+r W W l 1 s(x, M (t), w) = h(c)dc = m([x- -, x+-] n [M(t)- -, M(t) + 2]). (3.2) x-r 2 2 2 
Where m(.) is the measure of a set ( which is simply the length on the overlap 
in this case) and w = 2r. 
It should be noted that this is a share of the potential market ( which is the 
whole population), not a firm's share of actual sales in the market. Hence this 
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices does exist. 
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definition of market share differs from the one in common use. By definition a 
monopolist's share of sales is always 100%, which is completely uninformative . 
The midpoint M ( t) of the consumer distribution is assumed to be a function 
of time. For expositional ease we assume that M(t) a random walk random 
walk: 
M(t) = M(t - 1) + Et, (3.3) 
with c(t) rv N(O, 0"2 ). 
3.2.2 The Firm 
A firm has to decide where to locate its product in order to maximize expected 
,; 
profits. The launch date is assumed to be fixed in advance. The firm cannot 
observe the market directly but it can attempt to locate the market by surveying 
consumers. The management problem is to attempt to maximize profits by 
choosing when and how much to sample, a time frame for processing the samples 
and an organizational structure with which to process the samples. These choices 
are not independent and are determined by the production and management 
technology available to the firm. 
The technological situation a firm faces is considered next. 
Decision making by the Firm 
This is a model of product development for a fixed launch date in the face 
of evolving consumer preferences. Firms only gain informatiol). ~pout what is 
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happening in the market by surveying consumers. The product location decision 
(i.e. which x to produce) must be made prior to launch so there is no sales data 
from the product on which to base inference about the market. Instead a firm 
must go out and conduct some form of market research if it is to locate and track 
the population of consumers in the characteristic space. This market research 
might be in the form of questionnaire surveys or product pre-release tests. For 
example , feature films often have test screenings and their endings or offensive 
scenes are changed depending on viewer reactions. Another example is that 
some producers of computer software distribute beta versions of programs to 
test out new features before release. 
In order to capture as large a market share as possible , a firm really needs to 
know about the shape and location of the market when it releases its product. 
Conceivably, firms might be using market research to infer the distribution of 
consumer preferences, the form of the process by which this distribution changes 
over time and the history of shocks that have a persistent influence on the 
location of the market. Similar to most of the literature on a monopolist learning 
about its demand conditions, we simplify the problem the firm faces by assuming 
that it knows all the relevant functional forms and the values of all coefficients 
and variables , except the history of actual outcomes of M(t) 's and the c(t) 's , 
which are the shocks which occur to the market. 2 
Firms will be able to guess the correct location of M (t + 1) in period t with 
2For an example of learning in a differentiated products market see Harrington(l995) 
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probability O because there is a white noise shock term. However , a firm will 
get a positive payoff as long as its product interval overlaps with the market. 
The market transition process, Equation 3.3, is autoregressive , hence knowledge 
about past locations of the market will be useful in producing an estimate of 
where the market will be located at launch time. 
A firm is interested in acting to maximize expected profit. The profit from 
launching product x in period tis denoted by 1r. The profit will be the revenue, 
R , generated from the market share the product captures, less the costs. Costs 
are of two types: a constant marginal cost of production c and a fixed cost, F. 
Assume that price p and the size of the market Q are constants. Then the 
quantity sold is Qs(x, M (t) , w), and R pQs(x , M (t), w). Hence expected 
profit is given by 
E[1r] E[R- cQs - F] (3.4) 
(p - c)QE[s(x, M (t), w)] - F. 
Potentially there are two sources of fixed cost: fixed costs in the production 
I 
of the good and management overheads. In this model , management overheads 
could be of two types: the cost of collecting information and the labor cost of 
processing that information in order to make a decision. We are concerned here · 
with how internal structure and the behavior of firms are related, hence the labor 
cost of processing the information is of more interest . However, no method for 
endogenizing wages ( and hence labor cost) has yet been devised for this type of 
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model. An arbitrary choice of wages offers little insight, so the whole question 
of labor cost has been left as an avenue of future research. Thus the approach 
used here is similar to Van Zandt and Radner(1995) Van Zandt(1997d). 
The limited capabilities of a firm's employees are explicitly modelled by de-
scribing each individual as a processors and the organization as a programmed 
network. 
A processor has an inbox and a register ( which together comprise its memory). 
In one period of time a processor can perform one of: 
1. Read one number from the sample or its inbox and store it in its register, 
overwriting the previous contents of the register. 
2. Read one number, y, from its inbox, calculate a linear function of y and 
the contents of its register and store the result in its register; 
In addition to one of the above operations a processor can, at the end of 
a period, instantaneously write the contents of its register to the inbox of any 
processor to which it is connected ( this is called output). 
Together processors and connections form a network. A program specifies 
which operations each processor performs in each period. 
A hierarchy is a network that contains no loops or cycles of connections. 
Thus in a hierarchy information never comes back to a processor once it has 
been outputted. Supervisors and subordinates are defined for a hierarchy as 
follows. A supervisor of a processor is the processor to whom oµtp_ut is passed. 
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The subordinate(s) of a processor are the processor(s) from whom output is 
received. Processors with no subordinates receive only data from the outside 
world and are defined to be at level one. If a processor has subordinates then its 
level is one more than the maximum level of its subordinates. There is a unique 
processor, called the top processor or the boss, which has the highest level in the 
hierarchy. 
There is only one decision to be made by the network: which product to 
make. It is shown in Radner(1993) that for this type of decision and a network 
of processors, it is sufficient to consider only hierarchies. To describe the time 
taken to make the decision we introduce the concept of delay. Delay is the 
amount of time a hierarchy,, takes from the arrival of the first piece information 
to be used until the decision is produced. 
Firms certainly use information about market conditions when they launch 
a product. This information can rarely, if ever , be on every consumer, hence 
either explicitly or implicitly firms must use statistical inference based on what is 
essentially sample information to predict for the whole population of consumers. 
i 
As a result the language of statistical sampling and market research will be used 
to describe the way in which the firm uses information. 
The model should not be thought of as a literal attempt to describe the 
process of market research, rather the model tries to capture the interactions of 
information, organizational structure and product market decisions. 
Although specified here as a linear function , so that the network can calculate 
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a sample mean, the generalized form of this model only assumes that processors 
can perform an associative binary operation. The adding of numbers should be 
considered as an analogy of the processing of information and the producing of 
reports, recommendations and decisions that really go on inside the management 
structure of an organization. It might seem a trivial task to collate sample 
information, but the information which flows within this programmed network 
should also be thought of as the decisions and recommendations that are based 
on raw information. 
Section 3.3 examines the case of single period sampling in some detail. Nu-
merical techniques are used to determine the relationship between the informa-
tion processing structure, expected market share and the type of product. 
3.3 The Single Sample Approach 
Potentially a firm might choose any number of samples and any decision rule 
based on these in order to determine where to locate its product. 
The simplest possible approach is to take no sample at all and locate at the 
point which the entrepreneur believes will maximize profits. If the process by 
which consumer preferences change is stationary, then there exists a long run _ 
mean to preferences and this would be the sensible place at which to locate if 
no other information is used. This approach is likely · to do well if the- shifts 
in the market are small compared to the width of appeal of the product. This 
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approach makes a useful bench mark for comparison in stationary markets. 
If, as assumed here, the process by which the mid point of the market shifts 
is non-stationary, then by definition there does not exist a mean for the market 
transformation process which is independent of time. Thus there is no sensible 
reason for picking any point without sample information, since the expected 
profit for a randomly drawn location is zero. 
I 
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The next simplest case is to take a single sample and to make all decisions 
based upon this. Although perhaps not the optimal sampling approach if sam-
pling is costless and unconstrained, this approach is intuitively plausible. 
Sampling is not in general free and may have sizable fixed or marginal costs 
limiting the size and nurnber of surveys taken. In addition, there are institutional 
factors that may well constrain the number of surveys. The surveying process 
has not been modelled here, it just provides a number of data points which are 
to be processed to make a decision. The most common paradigm for market 
research is some kind of questionnaire based survey. It is however important to 
consider whether the survey questions are general or based on responses to a 
I 
specific experience. 
Returning to the feature film example, a general question such as "How much 
violence do you like in a film? " is going to be of limited use to film producers 
trying to decide if their film has too much violence. Instead they would like to 
know , in response to seeing their film, how many people thought it contained too 
much violence, and which particular scenes were disturbing. In order to gain this 
\ 
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information pre-release showings have to be arranged. It is not just the direct 
cost of re-editing and printing the film and organizing a showing that make these 
showings rare. It is important for products, like films, to hit the market with 
an up beat bang. Too much pretesting can indicate to consumers a product 
with a problem, the product looses its novelty and it gives more opportunity for 
competitors to copy or duplicate the product. 
For these reasons a firm may use only one sample, and then just decide how 
best to process that sample, and simultaneously with the choice of processing, 
how large the sample should be. This situation is close to the sampling problem 
of classical statistics, but in this model the cost associated with a sample is 
now endogenously determined by its impact on profits, rather than the cost of 
actually collecting the data. 
We begin by assuming that the firm takes a sample of size N which is the 
only source of empirical information used in the product decision rule. This 
sample is used to calculate a sample mean and the firm relocates on the basis 
of this sample mean. The calculation of the sample mean is performed by the 
people who work for the organization, by forming some programed network. 
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boss at level L) and that individuals at all levels above 1 have subordinates, the 
number of subordinates is known as an individual's span of control. The second 
assumption is that either all individuals at the same level have the same span 
of control (hence reducing the hierarchy to L parameters) or that the span of 
control at each level is the same, reducing the hierarchy to two parameters. 
In a binary hierarchy all spans of control are two. The binary hierarchy 
example is useful because its hierarchies are easy to visualize3 . The functions 
relating delay and sample size are also well behaved and can be parameterized 
by the single variable L. 
In a binary hierarchy there is one person at level L, 2 people at level L-1, and 
so on down so that there are 2£-I employees at the bottom (level 1). Summing 
over the number of levels gives ~f 1 2i-l total individuals in the hierarchy. 
It takes an individual two periods to add up two pieces of information, regard-
less of whether they are subtotals received from another person in the hierarchy 
or raw data from the sample. Assuming that each individual at level 1 receives 2 
pieces of raw sample data, then the hierarchy receives N ( L) = 2Lsample points 
and takes D(L) = 2L periods to process them into a decision. 
Figure ?? gives an example of a three level binary hierarchy processing the 
sample mean of the data set: {Cl, ... , CS}. Individuals are represented by the 
boxes. Each box shows the linear computation performed by that individual. 
The data points are shown being read in at the bottom of the hierarchy. 
3 Unconstrained choice of hierarchy is considered in the next chapter. 
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Figure 3.1: A three level binary hierarchy calculating the sample mean of the 
set {Cl , .... ,C8} of observations. Ti denotes a subtotal. 
These assumptions reduce a firm's organizational and sample decision to a 
single parameter , L. By choosing the number of levels in the hierarchy a firm 
also fixes the amount of information it can process and the amount of time it 
takes to do this processing and hence in which period to take the sample ( since 
for equal sized samples, the most recent one will al ways be the most useful). 
Next we need to consider the expected market share and hence expected 
profits associated with each size of hierarchy, and how these depend on . the 
environment in which the firm operates. 
Assume that the survey was taken in period t. The sample Ct = { c1, . . . cN} 
that a firm receives is the set of ideal points for the consumers who were surveyed. 
By calculating the sample mean C , the firm has an unbiased estimate of M ( t), 
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which was the mean of the distribution from which the sample came. Since this 
sample is the only information on which to condition expectations it follows that 
E[M(t)ICt] = E[M(t + D)ICt] = C , VD> 0. (3.5) 
Expected market share is the expected overlap between the firms interval , 
which will be [C- r, C +r] and the market interval [M(t + D)-i , M(t+ D) + i] , 
where D is the number of periods of delay caused by calculating C. Since the 
market shifts according to a random walk with Normally distributed shocks, the 
market interval can be rewritten as 
1 1 
[M(t + D) -
2
, M(t + D) + 
2
] · (3.6) 
D l D l 
[M(t) + Lc(t+i)-
2
, M(t) + Lc(t+i) + 
2
] (3.7) 
i=l i = l 
1 1 
[M(t) + T -
2
, M(t) + T + 
2
]. (3 .8) 
Where T = Lf 1 c(t + i) , is the sum of the shock terms. The shock terms are 
independent and identically distributed , c(t) rv N(O, cr2 ) , hence T rv N(O , Dcr2 ). 
The length of the overlap is a function of z = M ( t) + T - C , the distance 
between the centres of the two intervals. There are two cases depending on the 
size of w the firm's interval width. The following analysis assumes w < l , t his 
is the economically more interesting case of a product whose width of appeal is 
no bigger than the market. 
w if 0 < lzl < l~w 
s(C , M(t) + T, w) = ~ l~w - lzl if l~w < lzl < l~w (3 .9) 
0 if lliQ < lzl 
\ 2 - --
83 
,11 
\ 
To find the expected overlap the distribution of z = M(t) + T- C is needed. 
Let g(z) be the probability densities of z. 
Now E[z] = E[M(t) + T - C] = 0 and Var[z] Var[M(t) + T - C] 
Var [T] + Var [ C]. The variance of T is the sum of variances of the shock terms, 
of which there are 2L, and the variance of C is simply the variance of the 
sample mean of 2£ randomly chosen points from a Uniform distribution on 
[M(t) -1, M(t) + 1]. Hence 
- 2 1 
Var[T] + Var[C] = 2LO" + 
· 12 X 2 
(3.10) 
Although g (z) is not known, it can be approximated by its asymptotic distri-
bution, which is Normal. This gives the ar,proximation: z rv N (0, 2L0"2 + 1 ?.~?.L), 
where the density function f (z) of the Normal distribution with mean zero and 
variance 2L0"2 + 1 " ,~"r, is given by 
J(z) 
1 -z2 
J21r(D(L)0"2 + 1 ) exp( 2(D (L) 0"2 + 1 ) ) 
1 ?.N( L) 12N(L) 
(3.11) 
1 -z2 
,j21r(2La-2 + 1 ) exp( 2(2L0"2 + 1?. 1 ?.L)) 
12x2L .x . 
(3 .1 2) 
Thus , expected market share for w < l is 
(12w r1¥ l+w 
E [s(x, M (t), w)jO", L] = Jo 2wf(z)dz + }l-w 2( () - z)f(z)dz (3.13) 
2 
This integral equation cannot be solved analytically. However the relation-
ships between the variables can be examined graphically by solving the equation 
numerically, which is the approach adopted below. 
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Approximating g (z) with J (z) matches the first two moments for a small 
sample. It is shown, in the appendix to this chapter, that the true distribution 
g (z) is symmetric. The Normal distribution is also symmetric so, in fact, the 
first three moments are matched. However it is also shown in the appendix that 
the fourth moments of the two distributions differ, so that the kurtosis (fatness 
of the tails) is inaccurate in the Normal approximation. 
An alternative to approximating the true distribution analytically would be 
to simulate the true distribution using a Monte Carlo method. This 1s the 
approach used in the next chapter. The two methods give slightly different nu-
merical values for expected revenue, but qualitatively all of the following results 
are supported by either method (a comparison showing this is made in section 
4.9) . Although less accurate, the normal approximation has the advantage of 
giving a functional form which is useful for developing intuitive explanations in 
the next section. 
3.4 Results 
A difficulty arises in that market share is a function of three parameters, L , w 
and O". Thus at least one of these parameters must be assigned a specific value 
in order to produce a graph. We begin by comparing two hierarchies with fixed 
numbers of levels, L. The cases L = l and L = 6 are shown in Figure 3.2 and 
Figure 3.3 respectively. These cases are of interest because they correspond to 
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a single individual processing the sample ( L = l) and a rather deep hierarchy 
(L = 6). Many large companies have around six layers to their hierarchies, so by 
real world standards this type of hierarchy is on the big side in terms of levels 
( although the number of employees here is relatively small because only one task 
is being considered). The graphs show the market share these hierarchies expect 
to gain for ranges of w ( the width of appeal of the firms product) and o- ( the 
standard deviation of c( t)). 
Expected market share 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
3 
Standard deviation of 
shocks (cr) 
0.6 w 
5 1 Width of appeal (w) 
Figure 3.2: Expected market share for one level hierarchy L = 1. 
Both figures show the same general shape. In both cases a larger market 
share is obtained when the standard deviation of the shocks to preferences are 
small. This occurs because when shocks are small there will be little difference . 
between preferences in the period sampled and the period of the launch. If 
shocks are small, it is not so much speed as accuracy in forecasting which is 
important, hence the six level hierarchy which takes a larger sample does better 
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Expected market share 
1 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
3 
Standard deviation of 
shocks (er) 5 1 
Width of appeal (w) 
Figure 3.3: Expected market share for six level hierarchy (L = 6). 
when shocks are small. As shocks become large the firm's expected market share 
drops to zero - there is just too much noise for it to expect its forecast to be 
accurate. 
As the width of appeal of the product increases, so does the market share, 
as long as the shocks are not too large. Again, this is intuitive since the market 
share a firm gains can be no larger than the width of appeal of its product. 
The shapes of the two graphs do differ, suggesting that there are potentially 
interesting interaction effects amongst the parameters. These are not clear from 
the three dimensional plots. Hence, below, two dimensional graphs for two 
different values of a third parameter are compared on the same plot to -make 
the effects clearer. We shall focus in particular on two types of products which 
we shall now define. A specialized product (w = 0.1), which can gain at most 
10% of the market and a general product (w = 1) which could gain 100% of the 
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market. 
Aiming for a niche with a specialized product is a favorite principle of modern 
management, see for example Peters and Waterman(1982). The model used here 
allows rigorous analysis of the predicted performance of specialized products 
relative to general products. Intuitively one might believe that only having a 
small part of a market might leave a firm more exposed to shifts in preferences; 
we see that this is not necessarily the case. 
First we compare the performance of a small hierarchy ( L = l) and a large 
hierarchy ( L = 6), for both specialized and general products. The differences in 
expected market share for these two hierarchies are shown in Figure 3.4. Each 
line shows the expected market share-of a one level hierarchy less the expected 
market share of a six level hierarchy, for a specific type of product and for a 
range of shocks. 
In both cases the large hierarchy does best when the shocks are small (nega-
tive values on the vertical axis) and the smaller ( and hence faster hierarchy) does 
better for larger shocks. Note that, counter intuitively, the specialized product 
i 
is less affected in both absolute and relative terms by the size of the shocks. The 
specialized product width is smaller than the market interval, hence by aiming 
for the middle of the market, the specialized firm gives itself plenty of room to 
miss . The general product has a wider interval so it always has a larger mar-
ket share than the specialized firm, but is consequently relatively more affected 
when its forecast is inaccurate. 
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Difference in ex.rpected 
market share 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
-0 .1 
-0.2 
0.5 
w=l 
w= 0.1 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 
Standard deviation of 
shocks (a) 
Figure 3.4: Expected market share for a one level hierarchy less expected market 
share for a six level hierarchy. 
Next, in Figure 3.5 we examine the optimal choice of hierarchy for a special-
ized product when shocks are small ( er = 0.05) or a little larger ( er = 0.1). For 
small shocks the optimal hierarchy has four levels. As the shocks become larger , 
the optimal size of hierarchy decreases (for the er = 0.1 case, it has dropped to 
a two level hierarchy). When shocks are smaller, the cost of having too large a 
hierarchy (or too small) are relatively low, shown by the flatness of the er= 0.05 
line. As the world becomes more uncertain it becomes more important to be the 
right size. This sits well with the intuition that firms in a very static environment 
can survive despite inefficient bureaucracies. 
The situation for a general product, shown in Figure 3.6, is much the same. 
The general product is less effected by the increase in the size of the shocks, 
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Expected market share cr = 0.05 
0.1 
0.095 
0.09 I ~ =0.1 
0.085 
0.08 
0.075 
"' 
2 4 6 8 10 
Levels in hierarchy 
Figure 3.5: Expected market share for a specialized product ( w = O. l). 
since the slopes of the two curves are more similar than in Figure 3.5. In part 
this is because the general product was less able to fulfill its potential market 
/ 
share even when shocks were small. 
Instead of absolute performances we now consider relative performance. 
Expected percentage of potential market share= Expect market share x 100 
,.roduct width of appea- · 
(3.14) 
Recall, a pro<;iuct's width of appeal defines the maximum share of the market it 
could gain. Thus by this measure, if a firm which has w = O. l ( the potential to 
gain 10% of the market) expects to get a market share of 0.1 then it has fulfilled 
100% of its potential. This is an important real world consideration because it 
is the rate of return on investment, not the magnitude of profits , which is really 
important to investors. A specialized product should go hand in hand with plans 
for a lower level of production and hence less investment. 
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Figure 3.6: Expected market share for general product (w = 1). 
Figure 3.7 shows that for a small shock) the specialized product is expected 
to fulfill more of its potential than the general product. Also the specialized 
product's ability to fulfill its potential is reasonably insensitive to a suboptimal 
choice of hierarchy. However as the magnitude of the shocks increases the relative 
performance of the two products converge) see Figure 3.8. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The first part of this chapter takes the standard characteristic space model of 
demand for differentiated products ) and moves it to a dynamic stochastic setting. 
Consumer preferences change over time and are not directly observable ) hence 
he decision of which good to produce becomes significant and difficult. 
The firm solves the problem of which good to produce by using sample data 
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Figure 3.7: Expected percentage of potential market share for a specialized 
product and a general product when O" = 0.05. 
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Figure 3.8: Expected percentage of potential market share for a specialized 
product and a general product when O" = 0.5. 
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from the market. However, the individuals using the sample data are of bounded 
rationality, hence it becomes important for the firm to choose some form of 
hierarchical organization so that coordination can be used to overcome the limits 
of the individuals rationality. 
The model endogenizes the cost of delay in processing information. It fol-
lowed from this that large hierarchies perforn1 best in reasonably static environ-
ments when delay in making a decision was outweighed by the importance of 
accuracy. 
It was also shown that the choice of hierarchy was less critical for a spe-
cialized product firm than a general product firm when consumer preferences 
experience only small shocks. Also counter intuitively specialized product firms 
were expected to be more successful at gaining their potential market share than 
general product firms. However, the expected success in gaining market share for 
the two types of products , converged as shocks to consumer preferences became 
large. 
This theoretical model of market research has many obvious extensions: I 
am currently working on repeated play, multiple firms interacting strategically 
and using genetic programming to find solutions to the multi-period sampling 
version of the problem considered in this chapter. 
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3.6 Appendix: The First Four Moments of g(z) 
We now turn to the problem of calculating the first four raw moments of g (z). 
Recall g (z) is the distribution of the expression 
e+T-X. 
Where e is a constant, Tis the sum of 8 Normally distributed shock terms and 
Xis the sample mean of N independent draws from the uniform distribution on 
the interval [ e - ~, e - ~] . The first four raw moments of these variables are as 
follows. 
e is a constant so E [ er] = er for r = l , ... 4. 
By definition T-N(0,80- 2 ), hence the first four moments of Tare: 
E [T] 
E [T2] 
E [T3] 
; 
E [T4] 
0 
E [(T - E [T]) 2] =VAR [T] = 80-2 
E [ ( T - E [T]) 3 ] = 0 
E [ (T - E [T] )4] = 3V AR [T] 2 = 3820-4 
The first four moments of X are a little more involved to calculate because 
X is the average of N independent realizations of the random variable X which 
is uniformly distributed on [e - ~, e + ~] . The first step is to calculate the first 
four raw moments of X. 
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E[X] 
E [X2] 
E [X3 ] 
E [X4] 
e 
1e+1 rx3] e+1 1 x2dx = - = B2 + -e - 1 3 e-1 12 
2 2 
[
x4] e+1 3 1 - = e +-e 
4 e-1 4 
2 
r 
5Je+l ; e-: = (}4 + ~(}2 + 810_ 
2 
Using these moments we can now calculate the moments of X. F1rst the 
sample mean is an unbiased estimator of the population mean. 
E [x] = B. 
The second moment requires expanding the sum: 
E [(x)
2
] = E [ (! Lxir] = ~2E r (Lx/] 
~ 2 E [Lxl+ ~xixj] 
= ~2 r G) (~)E [X2] + G) (~)E[XJ2J 
Substituting for the previously calculated moments 
E [ (x/] = ~ 2 r N (e2 + 11J + N(N - 1)B2J 
e2 i 
+ 12N 
We repeat the same process for the third moment. 
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N 3 E [ (x/] - E 1Lx:+ Lxi2xj+ L xixjxk 
i#j i#j#k 
i#k 
- [ NE [X
3
] + C\) [:] E [x2J E [XJ + (i, ~, 1) ( ~) E [xJ3] 
- [NE [X3] +3N(N - l)E [X2] E[X] +N(N -1) (N - 2)E [X]3J 
Substituting and canceling 
E [ (x/] = ;3 [ N (e3 + !) + 3N (N - 1) (e2 + 112) B + N (N - 1) (N - 2) B3] 
- () ()3 
4N+ 
Finally the fourth moment 
N 4E [(x) 4] = E [Lxt+ Lxfxj+ Lx'fxJ+ Lx'fxjxk+ Lxixjxkxm] 
- NE [X4] + (/1) [:JE [X3] E[XJ + (/J (:)E [x2] 2 
+ ( 4 ) [NJ (N - 1) E [X2] E [X]2 + ( 4 ) (N) E [X4] 
2,1,1 1 2 1,1,1,1 4 
- N(B4 +~e2 + 8
1
0)+4N(N-1)(e
3 +!e)e 
6 N (N - 1) (()2 J_) 2 12N (N - 1) (N - 2) (()2 J_) ()2 + 2 + 12 + 2 + 12 
N ( N - l) ( N - 2) ( N - 3) ()4 +24 _. 
N l 1 _ __ + -N2 + -N3()2 + N4()4 
120 48 2 
Therefore 
[(Y)4] - - 1 1 _1 ()2 + ()4. E '-X - 120N3 + 48N2 + 2N 
\ 
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E[6+T-X] =0 
' µl = 0 
E[(e+r-x) 2] = E[((B+T-X)-o/] 
- VAR[(B+T-X)] 
- VAR [B] + VAR [T] + VAR [x] 
1 
- (}(;2 +-
l2N 
1 µ; = OCJ2 + l2N 
E [ ( e + r - x/] = E [ ( e + T - x)3] 
E [ ( B + T - S) 3] 
= E [B3 + 3B2T - 362S + 36T2 - 66T s + 3BS2 + T 3 - 3T2S + 3TS2 - S3 ] 
= B3 + 3B2 E [T] - 3B2 E [S] + 3BE [T2] - 6BE [TS] + 3BE [S2] + E [T3 ] -
3E [T2 S] + 3E [T S2] - E [S3 ] 
= 63 - 3B2 E [S] + 3BE [T2] + 36E [S2] + E [T3 ] - 3E [T2] E [S] - E [S3] 
= B3 - 3B3 + 365CJ2 + 38 (62 + - 1 ) - 35CJ2B - (_!L + B3 ) 12N 4N 
= B3 - 3B3 + 3B5CJ2 + 3B3 + 1 _ft_ - 35CJ2B - 1 _ft_ - B3 
4N 4N 
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µ3 = 0 
That is there is no skewness. 
E[(8+T-S) 4] 
= E [ 128TS2 - 1282Ts - 128r2s + 84 + 483T - 483 S + 682T 2 ] 
+682S2 + 48T3 - 48S3 - 4T3 S + 6T2S2 - 4T S3 + T4 + S4 
= 128E [TS2]-1282 E [TS]-128E [T2S]+84+483 E [T]-48 3 E [S]+682E [T 2 ]+ 
6(}2E [S2 ]+48E [T3]-48E [S3]-4E [T3S]+6E [T2S2]-4E [TS3 ]+E [T4]+E [S4] 
= -l28E [T2 ] E [S] + 84 - 483 E [S] + 682 E [T 2] + 682 E [S2] - 48E [S3] 
+6E [T2] E [S2] + E [T4] + E [S4] 
= -1282<50-2 + 84 - 484 + 682bo-2 + 682 (82 + iiN) - (~ + 83 ) 
,, 
6 J; 2 (LJ2 1 ) . 3 J;2 4 1 1 1 LJ2 LJ4 + uO- u + l2N + u 0- - 120N3 + 48N2 + 2N° + u 
= -1282bo-2 + 84 - 484 + 682bo-2 + 684 + 1 e2 - --1__ - 83 
2 N 4N 
6 J; 2{)2 1 S:J
2 3s:2 4 1 1 + 1 D2 + LJ4 + uO- u + 2u N + u 0- - 120N3 + 48N2 2N° u 
4a4 e
2 1e a3 ls:J2 
3
];2 4 1 1 = u + N - 4 N - u + 2 u N + u 0- - l 20N3 + 48N2 
/ a4 82 1 8 3 1 0-2 2 4 1 1 
µ 4 = 4u + -N - 4-N - 8 + 26-N + 36 a- - 120N3 + -48_N_2 
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Chapter 4 
A Flexible Price, Monopoly 
Location Problem with 
Hierarchies 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter a firm with an internal decision making structure was 
made the protagonist in a problem from industrial organization. In this chap-
ter the analysis is extended beyond the simple case considered in the previous 
chapter. 
The situation is again that of a firm launching a product into a market 
where consumer preferences change over time and are not directly observable at 
the population level by the firm. The firm will have to use signals on market 
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, ., /:; ;, , )"; in order to forecast the state of preferences at the launch date (which 
J ,_ rred to as the location of the market). 
1u re, using a forecast of market conditions will generally produce an 
·, ,.'c:n the chosen location and the profit maximizing location. We will 
,.tt, once chosen, the firm 's location remains fixed but we now allow the 
c.1_inst its price to maximize profits, given its location. 
_. "On d extension in this chapter is to impose no constraint on the class 
i;r~ s considered. In fact using a resuit from Radner(1993), the optimal 
,-; for the modeled decision problem will be analyzed. 
u unmodeled institutional constraints, actual firms may not use an 
: i·.,rarchy. Similarly a firm may not be able to adjust instantaneously " 
',: J of its product after launch. In these circumstances, the analysis in this 
,: u\·ides an upper bound on a firm's performance in this type of market. 
• Jc.:-s the assumptions of this chapter do apply to real world situations 
,JJ0\,1Jng example shows. 
'--·v'J,~Jutc~r software is a product who's price can be adjusted after its launch, 
I 
~.JcLL Y:nv·s characteristics remain fixed (in the short term at least). As the 
£,J:;_0Y:i11b example, from Carroll(1993, p86), of the IBM product Top View shows , 
01A irnal pricing after launch cannot undo the problem of having misread the 
n1<u-i-.e·c (i1_w to inappropriate organizational structure. 
i: ... the idea would have let people use more than one program at 
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once by allowing them to divide their screens into various windows. 
The idea would also have reduced complexity by giving them menus 
of commands to choose from,... As the months went on, however, 
IBM began to botch its latest software project for all the usual rea-
sons - it put too many people on the project , the work took too long, 
the software operated too slowly, and it turned out that customers 
wanted something much glitzier than IBM provided." 
Top View was a precursor of Microsoft's extremely successful Windows soft-
ware, and in that respect was based on a sound premise. Al though offering more 
advanced features than DOS and launched without a great deal of competition 
(Windows was not available until 1985) no pricing strategy could overcome IB-
M's problem of failing to match the direction the market would take: 
"(Top View) was dubbed TopHeavy by customers and became one 
of the biggest flops in the history of IBM's PC business. IBM wound 
up giving away most of the copies of Top View that it produced after 
its introduction in 1984." 
This chapter attempts to address two main questions motivated by this ex-
ample. What kind of management structure should a firm in this kind of market 
adopt in order to try and maximize profits? What effects do differing manage-
ment structures have on performance? 
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Bounded rationality, or if you prefer, the limited ability of humans to deal 
with information, is the key to understanding management structures. The 
intuitive explanation is that one individual cannot organize everything because 
of his/her finite mental capacity. Hence the task of running a firm is best split 
amongst a number of people. 
One simple version of this approach is to assume that performing manage-
ment tasks takes time and that each individual can only do one thing at a time. 
If it is important to perform rr.lanagement tasks in a timely manner, then there 
will be benefits from splitting tasks amongst a number of people so that different 
aspects of the same problem can be worked on at the same time. 1 
Section 4.3 shows how the results on optimal hierarchical st ructure from 
Radner(1993) can be applied to the real time decision problem considered here. 
As in the previous chapter the decision to be made will be the product location 
based on the forecast of market conditions, calculated from raw data on indi-
vidual consumer preferences. The optimal choice of organizational structure is 
the one which maximizes expected profit. Section 4.2.1 defines the market con-
1 
ditions the firm faces and derives the profit maximizing price ( and associated 
level of profit), given a location. 
The type of organizational structure determines the distribution of the error 
in the forecast of market conditions. In section 4.4 the distribution of the forecast 
error and the profit function ( as a function of forecast error) are combined to 
1This is the key intuition underlying Radner(1993) 
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give an expression for expected profit as a function of organizational structure 
and various parameters describing market conditions. A solution method for 
this optimization problem is also discussed in section 4.4 and the results are 
presented in section 4.5. 
4.2 Location then Price Model 
The particular model which we will use has two stages: a monopolist chooses 
location and then price. Using its management structure, the firm decides where 
to locate its product at the launch date. Upon fixing the location of its prod-
uct, market location is revealed to the firm , which sets its price accordingly to 
maximize profits. 
In this section, we describe the market which the firm faces and then calculate 
the profit maximizing price response for a given location. 
4.2.1 Market Conditions and the Optimal Price 
Following the standard specification, it is assumed that products have a char-
acteristic that consumers have preferences over, and that this characteristic can 
be represented by a real number x. Each consumer has a unique, most preferred 
value of the characteristic, called their ideal point, also represented by a real 
number c. The greater the difference between a consumer's ideal point and a 
particular product, the lower the utility that product provides the consumer. 
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Both products and ideal points must be in the characteristic space, which is 
assumed here to be the whole real line. 
To be specific, it is assumed that the indirect utility function or valuation 
-function U ( ·) for product x by consumer c has the following linear form in 
distance 
-U(x,c) =a-p-~lx-cl. 
Where a is the common valuation of the product, pis the price and~ the rate 
at which utility decreases with distance. The coefficient ~ is typically referred 
to as the transport cost. It is assumed that the price, valuation, transport cost 
and the functional form are the same for each consumer. The only difference 
between consumers is their location. 
Without loss of generality the valuation function can be renormalized so that 
the common valuation is 1. This implies that the new valuation function will 
have the form 
l-u (x, c) = -:;:_U (x, c) = 1 - p - K, Ix - cl. 
a 
Where p = f and K, = ~. We assume there is some outside option giving utility a a 
0, and that consumers have sufficient income to purchase for p E [O, 1] .2 It follows 
that consumer c will only purchase x if U (x, c) > 0. 
2
Under the renormalization the maximum valuation a consumer can have for a product is 
1. Thus the firm will not charge a price in excess of 1 because if it did no consumers would 
choose to purchase its product. 
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The width of appeal of a product, w(x ,p, K,) , is the section of the charac-
teristic space in which consumers would have to be located in order to purchase 
the product , that is , for a given x , the set of c for which for U (x, c) > 0. Under 
this specifications a product's width of appeal is given by 
[ 
1 - p l - p] 
w(x ,p,K,)= x- K, ,x+ K, . 
The quantity demanded of the product will in general be less than w because 
only those consumers whose actual locations are within w will purchase x . We as-
sume that consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval [µt - ~, µt + ~] .3 This 
population distribution is referred to as the market. We assume that the whole 
population of consumers gives rise to at most one unit of demand4 . Thus , the 
actual quantity demanded is determined by the intersection of w and the pop-
ulation of consumers [~ - ~, µt + ~] . For this reason the quantity demanded 
will be referred to as the population share, denoted s. The level of s is 
s ( x, p , K, /J,t) = m [ w ( x , p, K) n [µt - ~ , µt + ~] ] . 5 
Assume that K, ~ 2. This is the more economically interesting case , where 
for any price p > 0, even if the monopolist is located at the centre of t he market 
not all consumers will choose to purchase from it. 
3The process which determines µt is defined later. 
4 Again this is just a matter of scaling. 
5m [] is the Lebesgue measure 
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Production incurs a fixed cost, F, and zero marginal cost. Let 7f denote profit 
and let r denote revenue. The monopolist's profit maximization problem is 
max E [ 7f ( x, p, µt, r;,)] E [r (x, p, µt , r;,) - F] 
p,x 
= E [r (x, p, µt, r;,)] - F. 
Hence profits will be maximized if expected revenue , E [r (x ,p, µt, r;,)] is maxi-
mized. 
We first consider the profit maximizing price, p*, for each location x and the 
associated revenuer*, within a period (so that µt is fixed). Only the position 
of x relative to the market (µt) is in1portant, so without loss of generality we 
consider z = (x - µt) , which is referred to as the location error. A number 
,, 
cases, depending on the relative magnitudes of z and r;,, need to be considered 
in the calculation of p*. The details are in Appendix A of this chapter. 
1 if o < I z 1 < 1 - _1_ 2 - - 2 2K, 
p*(z, r;,) = < r;, (lzl + t - 1) if l - _L < lzl < l - _L 2 2K, - - 2 3K, 
~ (! - lzl + t) if l - _!_ < lzl < l + l 2 3K, - - 2 "' 
0 if lzl > l + l - 2 K, 
Substituting p* into r (p, z, r;,) gives r* (z, r;,) the profit maximizing revenue: 
i 
_!_ if o < I z I < 1 - _1_ 2K, - - 2 2K, 
r*(z, r;,) = < 
(2 + 2r;, lzl - r;,) (~ - lzl) if l - _!_ < I z I < 1 - _!_ 2 2K, - - 2 3K, 
I~"' (-r;, - 2 + 2 lzl r;,)2 if l - _!_ < I z I < 1 + l 2 3K, - - 2 "' 
·o if lzl > l + l - 2 K, 
Once the probability density f (z) of z has been determined, the expected 
revenue is calculated by 
l+.1 
E [r*] = j 2 K r*(z)J (z) dz. 
-(1+~) 
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In order to determine f (z) we must first describe the process by which a 
location x is chosen. We turn to that problem now. 
4.3 Decision Making and Organizational Struc-
ture 
We now consider the process by which a particular organizational structure de-
termines a forecast and hence decides where to locate the product . In section 4.4 
we examine how the different organizational structures affect expected revenue. 
There are two parts to the forecasting process that we model: the stochastic 
process which generates the observations ( considered next) and the organiza-
tional structure which processes the observations into a forecast ( described in 
section 4.3.2). 
4.3.1 The Real Time Decision Problem 
Consumer preferences change over time , that is , the distribution of ideal points 
changes. It is assumed that only one parameter µt changes. Assume that µ t 
follows a known data generating process , namely 
µt = µt-l + Et 
with Et rv N (0, cr2 ) . 
The assumption that the firm only has to learn about one parameter is purely 
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for expositional ease, and is typical of the literature on firms learning about 
demand conditions , for example Harrington (1995). With little modification 
the following could describe a firm using kernel estimation in order to build 
up an estimate of the distribution of consumers. This would add little insight 
and a lot more detail because, for example , the derivation of r* in the previous 
section would have to be based on the prior distribution of all possible population 
distributions. 
The firm knows the form of the process for µt but does not observe the actual 
values of µt. What the firm can observe is the ideal points of those particular 
consumers whom it surveys during a particular time period. The set Ct = 
{ c1, ... , cN} consists of the ideal points of the N consumers surveyed in period 
t. This is what we refer to as market research: ask someone what they like and 
they tell you what their ideal point is6 • 
Two assumptions are made here about the market research: surveys of con-
sumer ideal points are the only relevant information available and only one such 
survey is undertaken. The second assumption does have some justification be-
cause there is a large fixed cost incurred when a survey is conducted. Also 
products such as consumer software are fairly easy to duplicate , thus a firm will 
not want to make test copies too widely available before the final launch of the 
product. Relaxing the assumption of a single sample is quite hard technically, 
the process of updating the estimate of µt on the basis of new information is 
6 It is assumed that there is no strategic misrepresentation. 
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solved by the Kalman Filter, and Meagher and Miron (1997) show that a ver-
sion of the Kalman Filter is amenable to parallel computation. The remaining 
problem is to characterize the optimal organizational structure for the paral-
lel computation of the Kalman Filter, this is the subject of on going research. 
For the moment we consider only the single sample case, which we will show is 
sufficiently rich as to produce a number of interesting results. 
, 
The firm's decision making problem is to decide on a sample size and time 
period in which to survey consumers 1 an organizational structure with which to 
deal with all this information and a location based on the processed survey infor-
mation. The decisions on the quantity of information, the period for information 
collection and the organizational structure will be inter-related because of the 
assumption that dealing with information takes time. The exact relationship is 
considered next. 
4.3.2 Individuals and Organizational Design 
The limited capabilities of a firm's employees are explicitly modelled by d~-
scribing each individual as a processor and the organization as a programmed 
network. We will briefly restate the appropriate definitions. 
A processor has an inbox and a register ( which together comprise its memory). 
In one period of time, a processor can perform all or some of the following 
operations in the following order: 
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1. Read a number from the sample or its inbox and store it in its register, 
overwriting the previous contents of the register. 
2. Take one number, y, from its inbox, calculate a binary associative function 
of y and the contents of its register and store the result in its register. 
3. Write the contents of its register to the inbox of any processor to which it 
is connected ( this is called output). 
Together processors and connections form a network. A program specifies 
which operations each processor performs in each period. 
There is only one decision to be made by the network: which product to 
make. It is shown in Radner{1993) that for this type of decision, being made by 
a network of processors, it is sufficient to consider only hierarchies. To describe 
the time taken to make the decision we use the concept of delay. Delay, D, is the 
amount of time a hierarchy takes from the arrival of the first piece information 
to be used until the decision is produced. 
Let one sample consumer ideal point be one unit of information. There are N 
I 
units of information to be considered in Ct which all arrive at the same time. Let 
P be the number of employees ( also referred to as managers) who are involved 
,,,...._ 
in processing the N pieces of information. It is shown in Radner(1993) that D 
the minimum delay for a given N and P is 
"" lNJ D(N,P)= p +flog2 (P+NmodP)l. (4.1) 
\ 
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It follows that for a fixed N, the lowest possible value of D (N, P) is achieved 
with P = I~ l . The hierarchy which achieves this minimum delay for a fixed N 
is called the delay-is-everything hierarchy. 
The proof in Radner(1993) of these results is somewhat involved. However, 
Radner(1993) provides an algorithm for converting uniform binary hierarchies 
( which were considered in the previous chapter) into hierarchies with minimum 
delay for a given sample size and a given number of employees. The details of 
the algorithm will not be repeated here, but the intuition for the method gives 
insight into the character of optimal hierarchies. 
In a regular binary hierarchy the supervisors of the level which is currently 
processing are idle. Time could be saved if some of those in the current level ., 
were eliminated and their work passed to their supervisors. Time is saved in 
this way because there is an implicit cost in rereading information every time a 
report is passed upwards. This can be somewhat alleviated by eliminating some 
unnecessary reports ( and the individuals who authored them). Repeating this 
procedure until no more improvements can be made gives an optimal solution. 
j 
For a given N, there are I ~l managers in the delay-is-everything hierarchy, 
hence the choice of hierarchy can again be described by one parameter, N. These 
hierarchies have skip level reporting, do not have a regular shape and are not 
as readily interpreted in terms of levels as the completely uniform hierarchies in 
the previous chapter. However, conclusions about the size of the management 
structure can still be drawn in terms of the number of managers. 
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The model should not be thought of as a literal attempt to describe the 
process of market research, rather the model tries to capture the interactions of 
information, organizational structure and product market decisions. 
The relevant binary associative function will turn out to be a simple linear 
function of real numbers in this model. The adding of numbers should be con-
sidered as an analogy of the processing of information and the production of 
reports , recommendations and decisions that really go on inside the manage-
ment structure of an organization. It might seem a trivial task to collate sample 
information, but the information which flows within this programmed network 
should also be thought of as the decisions and recommendations that are based 
on raw information. 
The design of a real product is much more complex than choosing a number 
for its characteristics. For example , IBM learned that people wanted an operat-
ing system that was simpler to use than DOS. Converting that information into 
a product strategy is an enormously complex task. Without even producing the 
actual product IBM would have to make decisions on which platforms it would 
run under, what kind of interface ( words or graphics) , whether business users all 
want the same thing, what the demand conditions are in markets broken down 
by user type and geographic location and so on. All these things would have to 
be decided on from market research data. This is the process being described 
by the processing of consumer ideal points. 
Since the process which generates µt is non stationary there is no long run 
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expected value for µt, hence, a firm must use some market research to condition 
its product location otherwise it will have zero expected profit. 
As noted in the previous chapter, there is not as yet a method for endog-
enizing the level of wages in the information processing model. Thus wages is 
treated as a parameter. An arbitrary choice of wages offers little insight so we 
assume here that the level of wages is sufficiently low as to not affect the choice 
of organizational structure. This implies that the · firm w1ll only be choosing 
from amongst the set of delay-is-everything hierarchies. 
The minimum delay possible for each size N, is given by 1 + 1log2 Nl . Since 
there is no cost for extra information, only those N which are powers of 2 need 
be considered. 
4.4 Maximizing Expected Profits 
We have now specified the process by which a location x is calculated, all that 
remains is to determine the actual rule used to determine the location and the 
distribution of the location error it will produce. 
Assume that the survey was taken in period t. The sample Ct= {c1 , ... CN} 
that a firm receives is the set of ideal points for the N consumers who were 
surveyed. By calculating the sample mean Ct, the firm has an unbiased estimate 
of µt, which was the mean of the distribution from which the sample came. Since 
this sample is the only information on which to condition expectations it follows 
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that 
E[µtlCt] = E[µt+DICt] = Ct, VD> 0. (4.2) 
Where D is the number of periods of delay caused by calculating Ct. 
So the decision rule for the firm will be of the form x = Ct + :E where :E is 
some strategic move the firm wants to make away from its estimate of µt+D· It 
now remains to show that :E = 0 is the optimal choice. 
Now the market shifts according to a random walk with Normally distributed 
shocks, so µt+D can be rewritten as 
µt+D 
/ 
D 
µt + Lct+i 
i=l 
µt+T. 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
Where T = ~~ 1 Et+i, is the sum of the shock terms. The shock terms are 
independent and identically distributed, Et rv N(O,(J2), hence T rv N(O,D(J2 ). 
r* is a function of z = (µt + T - x) , the distance between the centre of the 
market and the actual location in period t + D. Also r* is symmetric about 
z = 0, non increasing in general and decreasing for sufficiently large z. 
T has infinite support therefore z also has infinite support. It was shown 
in the appendix to the proceeding chapter that the distribution g (z) (for z = 
(µt + T - C)) is symmetric. Therefore choosing :E # 0 would make lower rev-
enue z's more likely, while making higher revenue z's less likely. Thus, it is 
optimal to choose :E = 0. 
It is thus possible to calculate the moments of the forecast errqr. _for example 
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E[z] = E[µt(t)+T-C] = 0 and Var[z] = Var[µt(t)+T-C] = Var[T]+ Var[C]. 
- 2 1 
Var[T] + Var[C] = (1 + log2 N) CT + 12 (4.5) 
The distribution of g (z) is not known, so we could, as in the proceeding 
chapter, approximate g (z) by its asymptotic distribution, which is Normal. This 
would involve matching the first two moments of a Normal distribution with the 
mean and variance calculated above. Instead we construct the expected revenue 
curve by Monte Carlo simulation. Tl~e details of the simulation procedure are 
presented in the appendix 4.8. 
4.5 Results 
We now present the results of the Monte Carlo simulations. The underlying 
distributions are all known, so for specific values of the parameters the expected 
revenue function can be generated by simulation. 
The results from some interesting simulations are shown in Figures 4.1-4.3. 
Each Monte Carlo is based on 10000 repetitions so 1one can be quite confident 
that these curves, and the relationships between them, are accurate . . 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 both show that increasing CT for a fixed r;, leads to a lower 
level of expected revenue. This occurs because increasing CT increases the vari-
ance of the forecast error. For a fixed r;, the function r* is fixed and non-increasing 
in the magnitude of the forecast error. Therefore increasing the variance of the 
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Figure 4.1: Expected revenue for ~ = 2 
~ 
forecast error causes high revenue outcome to become less likely while low rev-
enue outcomes become more likely, thus decreasing expected revenue. 
These two figures also show that the optimal organizational size becomes 
smaller as CJ increases. Increasing CJ means that every period of delay will cause 
even more uncertainty about the future (greater dispersion of f ( z)). However 
the benefit of information (N) has remained the same, thus as CJ increases it 
becomes optimal for a firm to use less information and to act faster, and hence 
have a smaller organization. 
Comparing Figure 4.1 with Figure 4.2 we see that for a fixed CJ, changing 
the value of ~ has no effect on the optimal organization size. When CJ = 0.2 the 
optimal organization for both ~ = 2 and ~ = 20 is one person making a decision 
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,, 
based on two pieces of information. When (J = 0.075, the optimal organization 
for the two levels of r;, is four people using eight sample points to make a decision. 
These results indicate that in finding the best organization for forecasting , the 
firm does not need to consider the type of product it is producing because, 
intuitively, N appears in f (z, (]", N) but not in r* .7 
In both Figures 4.1 and 4. 2 the expected revenue curve is flatter for the lower 
value of (J than for the higher value. When (J is low, most of the dispersion in 
J (z) comes from the difference between µt and Ct. The variance of this difference 
is iiN which changes by only a small amount as N varies for sufficiently large N. 
7 A formal proof of this result would require consideration of tail behavior of both r* and 
f, which is intractable because the form of f is unknown. 
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Thus when (5 is small, suboptimal choice of organizational structure has little 
effect on expected revenue. However when (5 is large , var(T) = (1 + log2 N) (52 , 
dominates in determining the dispersion of J ( z) , and hence the expected rev-
enue. var(T) is much more sensitive to changes in N , increases unbounded in N , 
therefore the correct choice of N, and hence the correct choice of organization, 
become more critical. 
This result indicates that suboptimal firm sizes can more readily exist in 
markets where conditions are fairly static. Thus if there is any preference for 
management largess , in the form of large companies, it is more likely to be 
observed in stable markets. Fast changing markets penalize firms much more 
for suboptimal organizational choices. 
Expected revenue is increasing in K, by definition. A larger K, means a larger 
w so a product must be able to generate more revenue. What about relative 
performance? Relative performance can be compared by considering scaled rev-
enue, rs. Where 
rs (p, x, K,) = r (p, x, K,) x 2 K,. 
Figure 4.3 shows scaled expected revenue for two types of products: a general 
product with a low transport cost of K, = 2 and a specialized or niche product 
with a transport cost of K, = 20. At the same price the width of appeal for the 
mass appeal product is 10 times wider than for the specialized product . 
We see that scaled revenue for the specialized product is high..er than for 
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Figure 4.3: Scaled expected revenue for a-= 0.075 
14 
the mass appeal product. For the optimal organizational choice, the specialized 
product has an expected revenue which is almost 100% its maximum revenue. 
Expected scaled revenue for the general product shows that its expected revenue 
is 98% of its maximum revenue. Thus we observe that specialized products 
do better than general products in terms of fulfilling their revenue potential. 
However the difference for this pararqeterization of the flexible price situation 
is less dramatic than was seen for the fixed price simulations of the previous 
chapter. The result appears to hold for other parameter values in the variable 
price model, but has not been examined in detail. 
If the fixed cost F is directly proportional to the transport cost r;, then the 
specialized product would show a better rate of return than the mass appeal 
product. This corresponds to the anecdotal marketing eviden~e presented in 
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Peters and Waterman (1982) which advocates niche marketing. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter extended the basic model of the previous chapter to unconstrained 
choice of organization and a variable price. Qualitatively, the results for this 
specification of the model are the same as for the simple modei. 
We found that both the optimal size of the hierarchy and the optimal quantity 
of information arise endogenously when both the information processing abilities 
of managers- and- the economic problem are specified. The effects of market 
conditions on profitability and organization choice were also consider. It was 
shown that increasing the variance of shocks to consumer preferences decreases 
the optimal firm size and expected profits. Changing the transport cost of a 
product had no impact on the choice of organization. However, narrow appeal 
products (high transport cost) had an expected revenue which was a higher 
proportion of their maximum revenue that did mass appeal (low transport cost) 
products. This suggested that if the fixed cost is proportional to the transport 
cost then specialized products will have a better rate of return. These results on 
the performance of different types of products, specialized or general , are only 
preliminary but would be an interesting area for future research. 
There are a number of obvious technical extensions to the model, such as 
multiple period sampling instead of single period sampling, preliminary work on 
120 
! 
i 
i111 
\ 
this subject can be found in Meagher and Miron (1997). More generally, the 
approach of making hierarchies the decision makers in industrial organization 
games seems prom1s1ng. I am currently working on a duopoly location model 
and an oligopolistic product innovation model. 
4.7 Appendix: Derivation of the Revenue Fune= 
tion 
Recall z = x - µt. Due to symmetry, we can consider, without loss of generality, 
only the cases where x > µt. There are four such cases , depending on the 
magnitude of z relative to p and K,, which we will now considered in turn. 
First, if z > 1 + t then all of w (z, p )will lie outside the market , for all p > 0. 
In this case, revenue will be zero for all p > 0. We will refer to this as case 0. 
The other three cases are less straight forward. Case 1 is when the price , p 1 , 
is such that w (p1 , z) lies within the market [-!,!].If this is the case , then the 
population share will be given by 
; 
s(p1, z, K,) z + (l - P1) _ ( z __ (l_K,_P_1)) 
2 (1 - P1) 
K, 
This situation is depicted in Figure 4.4. The revenue for case 1, r 1 (p , z, K,) , is 
given by 
r1(P, z, K,) = P1 2 (1 - P1) 
K, 
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The first order condition for the revenue maximizing price , Pi is 
1 
2 4pi = 0 => p; = 2 
"1 "1 
Hence the maximum revenue under case 1, ri will be 
12 (1 - ~) 
2 "1 
u 
1-p 
l 
0 d 
d-(J-p)/K 
l 
• 
2(J-p)/K 
l 
1 
2"1 
0.5 
d+(l-p)IK 
l 
• 
Figure 4.4: Population share for Case 1. 
We now turn to finding the range of z for which Pi is the revenue maximizing 
price and r* 1 the maximum revenue. By assumption case 1 is true only.if w ( z, p 1) 
is within [-~, ~] . Since z is non negative, this will only be true if z + l-K,p1 < ~. 
However we know that in order to maximize revenue under case 1 the firm will 
set P1 = Pi = i. Thus the condition 
1 - Pi 1 1 
z+ =z+-<-
"1 2"1 - 2 
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must hold. Rearranging gives the region over which Pi does indeed maximize 
revenue at r; 
1 1 
0 < z < 2 - 2K,· 
u 
1-p_, 
2 
0 d 0.5 
• .. 
0.5-(d-(J-p)I K) 
2 
Figure 4.5: Population share for case 2. 
Under case 2, the price p2 is such that part of w(z,p2 ) lies outside the market . 
This situation is shown in Figure 4.5. Consumers who will purchase the product 
lie between z - 1--,_,,P2 and the edge of the market/population at ~. Thus the 
population share is 
1 ( 1 - p) 
s ( z, P2, "") = 2 - z - "' 
and hence the revenue under case 2, r 2 ( z, p 2 , K,) is 
(
1 1 - P2) 
r2 = P2 2 - z + "' . 
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The first order conditions for revenue maximization are 
1 1 - 2p; 
- - z + = 0. 
2 K, 
Rearranging gives 
K, (1 1) p; = 2 2 - z + K, . 
For the range of z for which case 2 holds this optimal price will give the maximal 
level of revenue r; 
r* - * ( 1 1 - *) 2 - P2 2 - z + K, P2 
1 
16K, (-K, + 2dK, - 2)2. 
Again, we need to determine the range of z such that charging p; will give 
rise to the conditions for case 2. That is, for which values of z, p; does indeed 
maximize revenue at the level given by r;. The first condition for case 2 is that 
w (z,p2 ) does not lie entirely outside the market. That is 
. . 
rearranging gives 
1 
1 - p; = _!__ (2dK, - 2 + K,) < 2 z- 4 
K, K, 
1 1 
z < - + -. - 2 K, 
So case 2 applies up to case 0. We now determine the other end of the interval 
on which case 2 holds. The second endpoint is given by the second condition for 
case 2, namely that 
1 1 - p; l 
- < z + = - (6dK, + 2 - K,) 2 - K, 4K, 
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rearranging 
1 _2_ < z. 
2 - 3~ -
It only remains to find the optimal price and associated maximal level of 
revenue for the remaining range of z, i - 2~ < z < i + 3~. This is the range of 
z that lies between cases 1 and 2. This case, which we will call case 3, is shown 
in Figure 4.6. 
u 
1-p 
l 
1-p 
3 
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2 
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,• .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -· : ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... .,, ................ ..,-.: ___ ............. .. .. .. 
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. . .· ,,"' ·. . . . . . . . . . . . -
d 
• • 
0.5-(d-(l-p_ )IK) 
3 
Figure 4.6: Case 3 
0.5 
If Pi is charged for z in this interval then by definition z is too close to the 
edge of the market for w (z, Pi,~ )to lie entirely within the market. Thus if Pi is 
charged, the conditions of case 1 are violated so it will not be the optimal price. 
Similarly charging p; leads by definition tow (z,p;, ~) lying entirely within the 
market, violating the conditions of case 2 for which p2 is the optimal price. 
We will now show that p3 such that z + l-}3 = i is the reven_ue __ maximizing 
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price for case 3. This is the price such that the right hand end of w (z ,p, K,) just 
touches the edge of the market. 
revenue 
0 P* P* P* 
1 3 2 
1 pnce 
Figure 4.7: Intersection of the case 1 and case 2 revenue functions. 
Consider Figure 4. 7. First we know that both the functions r 1 and r 2 are 
quadratic in price. 
On the interval [O, p3] we have, by construction, that z + 1-,,t3 > ~, therefore 
on this interval, revenue is correctly given by r 2 . However as was shown above 
( and is illustrated in Figure 4.7) r 2 is quadratic and its maximum lies to the 
right of p3 . Therefore revenue must increase as price is increased from O to p3 . 
Similarly on the interval [p3 , 1] revenue is correctly given by the function r 1 . 
Which implies that revenue increases as the price decreases from 1 to p3 . Hence 
p;, the optimal price under case 3, is given by 
* ( 1 1) p3 = z + K, - 2 K, 
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and the associated maximal level of revenue is 
* * (21 - p;) 
r3 = P3 "' 
1 
2 
( 2d K: + 2 - K:) ( 1 - 2d) . 
In summary the maximum revenue , r* , as a function of z is: 
1 if O<z< 1 - _.1_ 
2"" - - 2 2"" 
r*(z ) = \ 
( 2 + 2 K:d - K:) ( ~ - z) if l _ _L <z<l _ _L 2 2"" - - 2 3"" 
l~K, (-K, - 2 + 2dK:) 2 if 1 _ _1._< z< l+l 2 3"" - - 2 "" 
0 if z > l + 1. - 2 K, 
4.8 Appendix: Monte Carlo Simulations 
4.8.1 Monte Carlo Values ,, 
Values for expected revenue for the delay-is-everything hierarchies , calculated 
by monte Carlo simulation with 10000 repetitions. 
CJ= 0.2 CJ= 0.075 
log2 N "'= 20 K, = 2 K,= 20 K, = 2 
1 0.02101189 0.20356559 0.02354468 0.21894821 
2 . 0.02124086 0.20751456 0.02446284 0.23685974 
3 0.02037817 0.19973162 0.02479172 0.24273685 
4 0.01941837 0.19143193 0.02486382 0.24453731 
; 
5 0.01826924 0.18082125 0.02485755 0.24444690 
6 0.01722225 0.17138016 0.02479782 0.24313296 
7 0.01631026 0.16327122 0.02464005 0.24116235 
8 0.01541933 0.15566197 0.02451229 0.23909901 
9 0.01477746 0.14930366 0.02435879 0.23722819 
10 0.01417314 0.14355251 0.02412833 0.23444457 
11 0.01369993 0.13899398 0.02392792 0.23217054 
12 0.01330436 0.13499591 0.02369349 0.22945997 
\ 
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4.8.2 Code for the Monte Carlo Simulations 
The Monte Carlo simulations were performed in Matlab. An example of the 
code is shown below: 
%This program runs a monte Carlo simulation to find 
%expected market shares for specific k and sigma 
%values. The variable price monopolist model is used. 
%The number of delays is everything, one shot efficient 
%hierarchies, is set with maxdelay. 
nruns=input('number of replications='); 
maxdelay=input('the maximum delay of a hierarchy='); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% k=2 standard_deviation=0.75 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
k=2· 
' 
standard~deviation=0.075; 
for run=l:nruns 
% Generate the observations, shocks and forecasts 
o bservations=rand( 2/\ ( maxdelay-1), 1 )-0 .5; 
shocks=standard_deviation *randn( max delay, 1); 
for index= 1 :max delay 
forecasts(index)=mean( observations(l:2/\ (index-1)) ); 
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:i ctuaLmeans(index)=sum(shocks(l:index)) ; 
--< ·, cjndex for loop 
( run,l :maxdelay) =forecasts-actuaLmeans; 
·~%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
1is loop works out the profit for a part icular 
'- L·ated forecast error 
'i %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
~ex2=1:maxdelay 
ctbs( errors(run,index2)) <= 0.5-(1/(2*k)) 
revenue(run,index2)=1/ (2*k); 
:seif abs(errors(run,index2)) ,,> 0.5-(1/(2*k)) 
- . · 1-, (errors(run,index2)) < 0.5(1/(3*k)) 
revenue(run,index2)=(2+2*k*abs( errors(run,index2) )-k)* 
(O.S*abs( errors(run,index2)) ); 
_ lseif abs( errors (run,index2)) >=0.5-(1 / (3*k)) 
, · '·-'· _;_,( errors(run,index2)) <0.5+(1/k) 
I 
revenue(run,index2)=(1/ (16*k)) 
· ( \-l'\ -:?+ 2*k*abs( errors(run,index2)) )1' 2); 
' e1 se 
revenue(run,index2)=0; 
end %if statement 
1 11d %index2 for loop 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
end %run loop 
mrevenue=mean( revenue); 
save k2s075 mrevenue; 
4.9 Appendix: Comparison of Monte Carlo and 
Moment Approximation Methods 
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show the expected revenue predicted by both Monte Carlo 
simulation and the Normal approximation for various parameter values. The 
model used is the fixed price model of the previous chapter with the delay-is-
everything hierarchies from this chapter. 
In both figures the expected revenue curves produced by each method are 
very close. In particular it can be seen that the main results from the proceeding 
analysis will hold under either method. 
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Expected Market Share for Niche Product (w = 0.1) 
when a= 0.2 
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of Monte Carlo results and approximation with the 
Normal distribution. 
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Expected Market Share for Mass Appeal 
Product (w = 1) for a= 0.05 
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Figure 4.9: Comparison of the Monte Carlo results and the Normal approxima-
tion. 
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Chapter 5 
Empirical analysis of hierarchies 
5.1 Introduction 
,, 
There has, in recent years, been a growing interest in alternatives to human 
capital theory for the analysis of work, wages and labor markets. The leading 
alternative is what Lazear(1995) calls jobs-based analysis. Jobs-based analy-
sis is frequently identified with the theory of internal labor markets and the 
related empirical work on personnel records by Baker et al(1994a,1994b) and 
Lazear(1992). This work has used case studies of personnel records to identify 
a jobs hierarchy ( career ladder) and to look at the patterns of promotions and 
wages associated with these hierarchies. Human capital theory is a supply moti-
vated, closed form approach that interprets wages as the returns to investments 
. -
by individuals. The jobs-based approach instead focuses on the connection be-
tween jobs and wages. 
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Lazear(1995) identifies a number of important theories in the jobs-based ap-
proach: tournaments, hierarchies, hedonic wage analysis, job investment, insur-
ance and work-sharing. The least studied of the theories, in the context of labor 
markets, is the theory of hierarchies. The purpose of this paper is to present a 
brief survey of some hierarchy models and show their empirical predictions. The 
hierarchies approach then provides a framework in which the empirical analysis 
is conducted. The results of the empirical analysis can help to select between 
the existing models and more generally to indicate the facts which the ongoing 
work in this field needs to address. 
Hierarchy theory analyses management structures and is primarily an out-
growth of the theory of the firm. The hierarchies considered are defined by 
decision making and control in firms and are therefore different , and more read-
ily observed, than the jobs hierarchies considered by internal labor markets. 
To see this difference, consider a professional sports team. The management 
hierarchy is quite clear: at the bottom are the players and above them is a coach. 
Above the coach there is probably a manager who would have other subordinates, 
besides the coach, dealing with such things as the stadium, merchandising and 
legal matters. 
The jobs hierarchy is not so obvious because it is defined by patterns of 
promotion. Baker et al(l995,p256) identify two ways to define promotions: 
"Lazear(l992) resolves this dilemma by defining promotions as move-
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ments from a job title with a lower average pay to a job title with a 
higher average pay ... .In our own work we used yearly patterns of job 
transitions to infer promotions" . 
Returning to the example of a sports team, the salaries of coaches are gener-
ally lower than those of top players so the Lazear approach would actually find 
that players who become coaches are demoted. This is less of a problem under 
the approach of Baker et al, but players only infrequently become coaches so 
Baker et al are more likely to find no hierarchical relationship between players 
and coaches. 
This example is not intended as a criticism of the construction of job ladders 
but rather to highlight an important difference between job ladders and manage-
ment hierarchies. To construct a firms job ladder requires analysis of the whole 
firm over a period of time, since the job ladder is defined by the dynamic process 
of promotion. Self-reporting of promotions is unlikely to be of use because the 
appropriate criteria are not simply change in job title or wage. On the other 
hand the management hierarchy for a firm can be defined at a point in time 
by mapping out the superior-subordinate relationship. The simplification goes 
further because the position of an individual in a hierarchy can be calculated 
just by asking her about the number of levels of subordinates below her and the 
number of levels of superiors above her. These are questions that can easiJy be 
asked in a traditional random sample of individuals. 
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Why job ladders are of interest is well known, but the significance of man-
agement hierarchies is less so. The functional relationship between a superior 
and a subordinate in a management hierarchy is a relationship affecting produc-
tive activity that has implications for wages not suggested by the job ladders 
approach. The actions of a supervisor spill over onto all her subordinates af-
fecting their productivity and hence the wages of the subordinates in a manner 
which is determined by the type of spillover and the nature of the employment 
relationship. To see this more clearly consider the three simple organizations in 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
0 0 0 
(a) Market 
(b) 2 level hierarchy 
Figure 5.1: Two possible organizations of three people. 
Economic activity can either be organized across a market, Figure 5.l(a) 
or within a firm, Figures 5.l(b) and 5.2. We know from the transaction cost 
literature that the firm will be the chosen form of organization 'Yh~p. it is more 
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efficient. For a firm to be more efficient means, for example, that for the same 
effort the value of total output of the three individuals A,B and C is greater when 
they coordinate their activities by organ1z1ng themselves in a firm/hierarchy 
(5.l(b)) than when they act individually (5.l(a)). If the value of total output is 
higher then there is a surplus, generated by organizing in the hierarchy, which 
is to be split between those in the hierarchy. 
The way in which the surplus is split will depend on the bargaining power 
and the threat points ( outside options) of the various individuals involved. It 
is widely accepted that A, the boss of the two level firm will capture a large 
part of this surplus. But the situation is more complex because we have not yet 
considered the productive affect of A on B and C; and the possibility of other 
organizational forms. 
In the two level hierarchy, A is the owner of the firm and manages B and C. 
If the actions of A affect the productivity of B and C, and hence total output, 
then it is natural to conclude that A's income will be increasing in A's ability 
to manage. However being better managed increases the marginal product of 
B and C, therefore if they have any bargaining power their pay will also be 
increasing in the quality of management provided by A. Other factors which 
will influence the outcome of the bargaining are the alternative options. Can B · 
and C work in another firm or is self employment (market organization) their 
only option? Must A be the owner manager or could A be a middle manager in 
a larger firm? 
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Now consider the three level hierarchy in Figure 5.2. The actions of D influ-
ence the productivity of the four bottom level workers and the two managers, 
so it might be reasonable to conjecture that D's income is even higher than A's 
was in the two level hierarchy. A is no longer the boss but is still the manager 
in charge of B and C. What influence would this change in hierarchies have on 
the incomes of A,B and C? The answer to this question depends on exactly how 
management effects productivity and wage determination. 
These simple examples raise two questions. How do wages change w:th the 
number of levels of subordinates below an individual? An example of this would 
be comparing the wage of say A and B (B is one level below A) or B and D ( B 
is two levels below D) in the three level hierarchy. How does the management 
structure in which an individual works affect their wage (for example compar-
ing the wage of B in the two level hierarchy with B's wage in the three level 
hierarchy)? 
These are empirical questions that could be answered with an individual level 
survey which includes the appropriate questions about the individuals place in 
the hierarchy. Fortunately such a survey exists, which will allow the empirical 
analysis of these questions for the first time. 
The paper first provides a brief survey of some relevant results from hierarchy · 
theory in Section 5.2. This provides a framework for the empirical analysis and a 
more formal motivation for considering the impact of hierarchies on wages. The 
models chosen show some of the range of predictions possible from hierarchy 
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Level 2 
Level 1 
Level 0 
Figure 5.2: A three level hierarchy. 
theory. The data set used is described in Section 5.3. The data set has both 
human capital variables and hierarchy variables so the empirical analysis 1n 
Section 5.4 utilizes both theories. 
The paper first provides a brief survey of some relevant results from hierarchy 
theory in Section 5.2. The data set used is described in section 5.3. The data 
set has both human capital variables and hierarchy variables so the empirical 
analysis in Section 5.4 utilizes both theories. 
5.2 The Grand Contract Model 
The grand contract model is so named because the owner/manager of the firm 
chooses the incentive structure for the whole organization and no other contracts 
are written. 
The assumptions of the grand contract model are highly stylized and ig-
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nore a number of significant factors such as endogenous choice of hierarchy, 
side contracting and irregular hierarchies. However , the assumptions do make 
the model amenable to formal analysis and amongst the theories of hierarchies 
this approach has been the most successful at deriving formal propositions on 
organizational structure and wages. 
5.2.1 Organizational structure 
Consider a firm that has a hierarchical organization. lt3 internal structure is 
akin to the common intuitive model of management organization expressed in 
organizational charts. Those at the bottom are occupied solely with the direct 
production of the firm's output. They have supervisors to coordinate and direct 
their work. The supervisors in turn are supervised, and so on, up the hierarchy 
to the owner or chief executive officer. For convenience the person at the top of 
the hierarchy will always be referred to as the owner. We assume that everyone 
except the owner has exactly one superior. Thus the organizational structure is 
a tree , with the owner at the root and the workers at the leaves. 
Each worker is assumed to have exactly the same number of superiors in 
the chain between the worker and the owner, and anyone who does not have 
subordinates is a worker. Hence we can uniquely define the level of each person 
in the tree. All workers are at level 0. Those who directly supervise workers are 
at level 1, those who supervise level 1 supervisors are at level 2, and so on up 
the hierarchy until the boss who is at level L. 
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The number of employees in level l is denoted Xz and must be a positive 
integer for l < L. By definition XL = l. The span of control for a supervisor 
is the number of people in the level below her who she directly supervises. It 
is assumed that the span of control is constant across s·upervisors at the same 
level. Hence the span of control at level l, denoted Sz, satisfies Xz_ 1 = SzXz. 
The owner is a residual claimant and hence maximizes profits by maximizing 
revenue less the wage payments to employees. The determinants of revenue and 
wages are considered next. 
5.2.2 Production and Management 
Production is undertaken by the N workers in level 0. N is fixed for the deriva-
tion of the optimal organizational structure. Hence variations in organizational 
structure all occur in the supervisory levels. Qian(1994) explains the assumption 
of a fixed N by assuming a technology which requires a fixed amount of capital, 
k, per worker and that the firm has a fixed capital stock K. Qian does not add 
a capital market in which K is determined, so this additional assumption adds 
nothing substantial to the model and will be omitted in the following analysis. 
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Only a single period of time is considered so the model is static. 1 
Two possible classes of activity are envisaged for supervisors in the grand 
contract models: monitoring and management. Monitoring is checking the work 
of direct subordinates in order -to prevent shirking. Monitoring is considered, 
along with efficiency wages, in the following section. The management function 
is more subtle. It is an attempt to capture the planning and coordination tasks 
which are a significant part of what supervisors do. 
There is a division in the literature between those that allow for some 
type of management function, for example Williamson(1967) , Beckmann(1977), 
Rosen(1982) and Qian(1994) and those that do not, for example Calvo and 
Wellisz(1979) . In those papers that do include a management function this is 
achieved by defining a recursive production technology. We will attempt to de-
fine an encompassing framework that allows both the comparison of the various 
specifications of a management function and a comparison with those models 
which do not include a management function. 
Let Ciz be the effective skill that employees at level l apply to their jobs. 
I 
Effective skill is in the range O < Ciz < l where 1 is the maximum effective skill 
possible. Ciz is constant within a level but may vary between levels. Effective 
1 Clearly in the real world the actual number of people employed must be an integer. For . 
the purpose of analysis tms restraint is often ignored, see for example Qian(1994). In a richer 
model a fraction of an employee would be possible by considering a partime employee as a 
fraction of a fulltime employee. Meagher(1996b) and Van Zandt(1996) consider these different 
types of employment in the information processing model of teams. 
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skill is a composite open to various interpretations. It could be an individual's 
ability ( either acquired or inherent) or effort, or some combination of both. 
Williamson(l967) assumes that D'.z = a, where a is constant and O < a < l. 
Qian fixes O'.£ = 1 and makes az a choice variable for all other employees. 
Let g (a) be the opportunity cost of supplying a (for those individuals for 
whom a is possible). 
Following Qian(1994) the recursive technology of management is defined by 
assuming that an intermediate product called "managerial effectiveness" is pro-
duced. Planning and coordination which are the intuitive command functions 
on which managerial effectiveness are based flow down a hierarchy. Hence a 
supervisor at level l produces managerial effectiveness by taking Yz+l, the man-
agerial effectiveness of their immediate supervisor, and combining it with their 
effective skill O'.z to produce their managerial effectiveness yz. This process can 
be expressed by the function Yz = Fz (Yz+1, az). For simplicity Fz is generally 
assumed to be invariant across levels and to have a simple functional form. 2 
Williamson(1967) and Qian(1994) both assume a multiplicative form Yz 
Yz+1 az. It follows that in Williamson(1967) Yz aL+l-l and Qian(1994) Yz 
D'.zD'.z+l···aL. 
The maximum output for a worker is () > 0, which occurs when Y1 = 
1. Therefore total/gross output from all workers is ()Ny1 , which is also total 
revenue since price is normalized to 1. This simple model makes output a func-
2It is not known what properties Ft(.) must have in order for the model to be tractable. 
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tion of the production technology, the effectiveness of production workers, and 
the effectiveness of management. 
5.2.3 Monitoring 
Supervisors in the hierarchy also perform monitoring on the inputs and outputs 
of direct subordinates in order to detect shirkers. 
To encompass the variety of modelling approaches we define /3i to be effec-
tive skill in supervision for a level l employee. Similar to ai, effective skill in 
supervision is a composite of ability and effort. Again it is assumed that /3i is 
constant within a level but may vary between levels. 
Monitoring is assumed to be the only activity that supervisors undertake 
which requires time. Shirking is detected by observing the work of a direct 
subordinate, and hence only one subordinate can be monitored at a time. The 
effectiveness of a supervisor in observing the effort of a subordinate is determined 
by the supervisor's /3 ( effective skill in supervision). Thus the probability Pz of 
a level l supervisor detecting a shirking subordinate at level l - l is /3i/ si. 
1 
Let h (/3) be the opportunity cost to an employee to supplying /3 ( assuming 
that they are able to). 
5.2.4 Efficiency Wages 
In all the following cases limited liability is assumed so that wages cannot be 
negative. In order to implement an effective managerial skill of a* the following 
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family of incentive schemes is considered: 
pay w if a > a* is known, or if a is not known; and 
pay O if a < a* is known. 
The predictions for wages in hierarchies from the grand contract model de-
'j 
pend on the particular specification of the model. In the following , a range of 
results on wages are surveyed. 
Williamson(1967) 
Williamson(1967) pioneered the study of management hierarchies with his model 
of loss of control in supervision. However wages are assumed to take the form 
Wz = Wo'TJL-l where 71 > 1. Thus the only empirical test concerning wages that can 
be made of the Williamson model is this assumption. The model has no impli-
cations for changing wages with firm size, or indeed for organizational structure 
to determine the level of wages within a level. 
Calvo and Wellisz(1979) 
Calvo and Wellisz(1979) focus on income distributions and ability. The following 
assumptions are particular to their model. The probability, Pz, of a level l worker 
getting caught shirking is 
f3z+1 
Pz = Sz+1 
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That is, the probability of getting caught depends not just on the number of 
other employees being supervised but also on the proficiency in supervision. It 
is assumed that the owner's proficiency is 1. 
This model focuses on supervision alone, that is it assumes az = l and hence 
Yz = l for all individuals who are working and O:z = 0 for all individuals who 
shirk. Thus employees choose either full effort in work or complete idleness. Let 
the welfare difference between effort and idleness be k = g (0) - g (l). Then the 
efficiency wage under the given set of contracts must satisfy 
Wz > pzh (/Jz) + (l - pz) (wz + k) 
hence 
Wz = (l/pz - l)k + h(/Jz). 
Calvo and Wellisz explicitly assume that the outside option for an individual 
is self-employment, which they implicitly take to involve full effort: a = 1. Thus 
the opportunity cost term h (/Jz) is defined net of g (l) in their analysis. 
The two relevant results from Calvo and Wellisz(l979) are not stated explic-
1 
itly in propositions in their presentation. Thus I quote how they describe their 
results . Their first result is the most contentious so I have reproduced their 
derivation of the result in Appendix A of this chapter. Their second result is 
much more standard so I refer the interested reader to the original paper for the 
derivation. 
The first important empirical implication of the Calvo and Wellisz(1979) 
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model is the following: 
Conjecture 10 The optimal wage and supervisory effectiveness for a level is 
independent of the number of levels above that level. 
" ... the optimal wage and labor quality for a hierarchic layer is inde-
pendent of the number of layers superior to the one for which the 
choice is made. . .. we have just shown that the production workers 
will be offered the same conditions of work regardless of the num-
ber of hierarchic layers in the enterprise, and the same will hold for 
the second- and higher -layer employees. The result is realistic, and, 
unlike some results that follow, it is reassuringly neoclassical." 
The empirical validity of this result is not nearly as self evident as Calvo and 
Wellisz assert, as will be shown in the empirical testing in Section 5.4. Their 
second major finding corresponds much more closely with casual empiricism: 
" ... even if work at all hierarchic levels is equally difficult and equally 
onerous, a profit-maximizing enterprise will assign the better quality 
workers to the higher ranks and will pay them higher wages· than 
those paid _at the lower ranks to the lower-quality workers." 
They also prove that the differences in ability of workers at different levels 
is not the only factor causing inter level wage differentials: 
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" ... which shows that the interlayer wage differentials are greater than 
the differentials in effective labor per physical worker. In a hierarchic 
organization there is, as it were, a multiplicative productivity effect. 
If a worker shirks, the firm loses the worker's product. If a supervisor 
shirks and, as a consequence, the workers under him shirk, too , the 
firm loses the produce of the entire productive workers' team. This 
is the basic reason for assigning the more productive workers to the 
higi:er-level jobs and offering them a wage higher than would be . 
accounted for by their higher efficiency." 
This is an interesting theoretical result and can be expressed as the following 
,, 
empirical conjecture: 
Conjecture 11 Wages should increase with hierarchical level after actual ability 
is corrected for, not just observed characteristics. 
Qian(1994) is critical of the approach in Calvo and Wellisz on two fronts. 
First the choice of effort is binary: work or shirk. This assumption is relaxed 
1 
in Qian's framework, which is considered in the next section. Qian also argues 
that Calvo and Wellisz assume a fixed number of levels in the hierarchy and 
that this causes a bottle neck, at the top of the organization, which produces 
the above results. Qian's bottleneck criticism appears unfounded since the first 
result from Calvo and Wellisz showed that the number of levels above a level is 
irrelevant . 
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Qian(1994) 
Qian(1994) assumes that (3 1 and h ((3) 0 for all employees. Incentive 
compatibility requires that 
w - g (a*) > P · 0 + (l - P) w - g (a), for all a< a*. 
This gives an efficiency wage of w = g (a*) /P. Now P = l/sz if the employee 
under consideration is at level l - l, thus the wage function for each level of the 
hierarchy is given by 
Wz = g (ar) Sz. 
The optimization problem of the organization is expressed by 
L 
max BNy1 - L (g (az) Szxz) 
Sl, al, L 
l=l 
s.t. Xz SzXz-1 
Yz = Yz-1az 
x 0 = l, XL= N and y0 = l. 
Qian(1994) solves this problem for the case where L and Sz are integers, and 
for a continuous approximation where all the variable can take on continuous 
values. 
The continuous approximation uses a dynamic programming approach based . 
on Keren and Levhari (1979). Under the continuous approximation the firm's 
optimization problem becomes 
max BNy1 - {L (g(a1)s1x1)dl 
sl,az,L } 0 
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s.t. Xz 
Yz 
Xo 
Xz log ( sz) 
Yz log ( az) 
l, XL= N and y0 = 1. 
For the purpose of the empirical analysis in Section 5.4 the following results 
from Qian(1994, p537-538) are relevant. 
Proposition 12 (i) As N increases, the total number of tiers of the hierarchy 
·increases (dL/dN > O); and 
{ii)as the productivity parameter B increases, the total number of tiers of the 
hierarchy increases if and only if the span of control at the bottom is larger than 
that at the top. ~ 
Proposition 13 For any person remaining in level l, 0 < l < L, when N 
increases, the optimal hierarchy will adjust so that his wage payment decreases. 
It follows from Proposition 12 that an individual remaining at the same 
level, as N increases, will have more levels above them in the hierarchy. From 
I 
Proposition 13 it follows that the wages of such a person will decrease. This 
suggests the following testable conjecture. 
Conjecture 14 If hierarchies are optimal and they vary in height because of N, 
then for individuals at the same level we would expect increasing the number of 
tiers above the individual to have a negative effect on wages. 
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Proposition 15 For any person maintaining T levels above them, 0 < T < L, 
when N increases, the optimal hierarchy will adjust so that his wage payment 
increases. 
This leads to another testable conjecture: 
Conjecture 16 If hierarchies are optimal and they vary in height because of N, 
• 
then for individuals with the same number of levels above them we would expect 
increasing the number of levels below the individual to have a positive effect on 
wages. 
Qian motivates treating N as fixed due to fixed capital stock K. This is more 
likely to be binding in the short run than in the long run. The conventional 
economic wisdom is that the optimal scale of production is chosen in the long 
run. This intuition suggests that differences in the size of hierarchies will occur 
as the result of differences in the values of 8. Note that Qian's analysis does not 
address the empirically relevant question of how the total number of employees 
varies as N and() change. This is because the spans of control may1also readjust 
as the height changes. 
We turn now to the case where changes in the hierarchy and wages are due 
to changes in (). 
Proposition 17 For any person with a fixed number of levels below or above 
them when () changes, the optimal hierarchy adjusts so that their wage increases. 
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By similar reasoning to that used above, Proposition 17 leads directly to the 
two following empirical conjectures. 
Conjecture 18 If hierarchies are optimal and they vary in height because of e, 
then holding the number of levels below an individual constant while increasing 
the number of levels above them should be associated with increasing wages. 
Conjecture 19 If hierarchies are optimal and they vary in height because of e, 
then holding the number of levels above the individual constant while increasing 
the number of levels below should be associated with increasing wages. 
5.3 The Data 
The data used in the following analysis is from four surveys of Australian citi-
zens conducted by the National Social Science Survey (NSSS). The surveys are: 
NSSS First Round 1984, NSSS 1986-87: Role of Government , NSSS 1987-1988: 
Inequality and NSSS 1995-96: International Social Survey Programme-National 
1 Identity Module & Reshaping Australian Institutions. Sampling was chosen by 
stratified systematic random sampling of the Australian electoral roll. 3 The 
1984 survey was conducted face to face while the other surveys used a self com-
pletion (mail out, mail back) method. Bean (1991) reports that the surveys 
closely approximate the Australian population as recorded in the 1986 ~ensus 
3 All Australian citizens are required to be on the electoral roll. 
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and that there do not seem to be any significant differences in the rate or quality 
of response between the different survey methods. 
These four surveys are pooled and a sub-sample is used. The sub-sample 
consists of men between 18 and 65 years, who work at least 1250 hours a year, 
work in the private sector and are not self employed. Only those with earning 
of less than $250000 and an effective hourly wage of at least $3 are used.4 
The definitions for the variables used are given in Table 5.1, with the excep-
tion of the above and below variables w:iich require more careful exposition. 
Table 5.1 
Variable Definition 
earnings Total pre-tax wage and salary income 
from the previous 12 months. 
hoursworked Usual number of hours worked per week for pay. ,, 
weeksworked 
lnwages 
education 
experience 
experience2 
married 
union 
metro 
firm size 
yearXX 
Number of weeks of paid work in the last 12 months 
(including paid vacation and sick leave). 
Natural logarithm of eamings/(hoursworkedx weeksworked). 
Number of years of education, including imputed 
values for post secondary qualifications . 
Number of years worked for pay (where the 
individual worked most of the year). 
experiencex experience. 
Married or in a defacto relationship. 
Trade union member. 
1 
Lives in a city with a population of at least 500000. 
One plus the number of individuals , beside the respondent, 
who usually work for the company as full time employees. 
Dummy variable for survey year. 
The supervisory hierarchy in which the respondent works is calculated from 
4The minimum hourly wage in Australia through out this period exceeded $3. These 
two exclusions remove a small number of individuals , the majority of whom appear to have 
misreported. 
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the following four questions. Do you have a supervisor in your job to whom you 
are directly responsible? If so, does that person have a supervisor on the job 
to whom he is directly responsible? In your job do you supervise anyone who 
is directly responsible to you? Do any of these persons supervise anyone else? 
From these questions it is possible to calculate below and above. 
below is the number of levels of subordinates below an individual. It takes 
on the values 0, 1 and 2. Similarly, above is the number of levels of supervisors 
a respondent has, referred to as the individuals superiors. Again, it takes on 
the distinct values 0, 1 and 2. It should be noted that for these two variables 
the value 2 does not mean exactly two levels ( of superiors or subordinates, as 
appropriate) but rather at least two levels. below and above are then broken down 
into dummy variables for each of their respective values. For example, below=1 
equals 1 only for those respondents who have exactly 1 level of subordinates, 
that is when below equals 1. To see how these variables represent hierarchical 
position, consider Figures 5.1 and 5.2. A is at the bottom of the hierarchies in 
both figures so below is O for A in both cases, hence below=1 is O and below=2 is 
0. In Figure 5.1 there is one level above A so above takes the value 1 ( above=1 
is 1 and above=2 is 0). However in Figure 5.2 there are two levels above A so 
above takes the value 2 for A in this case ( above=1 is O and above=2 is 1) . 
The means and standard deviations for the variables are shown in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 
Means and Standard Deviations of variables for the sample 
of men in full-time employment used in the empirical analysis 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation 
lnwages 2.463 0.520 
year86 0.185 0.388 
year87 0.215 0.411 
year95 0.2615 0.440 
education 11.555 4.700 
experience 21.053 12.210 
experience2 592.163 ' 585.101 
married 0.693 0.461 
metro 0.504 0.500 
union 0.359 0.480 
below=1 0.318 0.466 
below=2 0.235 0.424 
above=1 0.213 0.410 
above=2 0.575 0.495 
marriedx year95 0.194 0.396 
unionx year95 0.076 ,' 0.265 
firm size: 10-99 0.316 0.465 
firm size: 1 OD+ 0.501 0.500 
5.4 Empirical Analysis 
Table 5.3 shows the means of real annual earning by hierarchical position, for 
the sample. The pattern in mean wages for supervision matches with casual 
emp1nc1sm: average earnings increase with levels in the hierarchy below the 
individual. Earnings increase from $24956 for workers at the bottom of the 
hierarchy, to $30215 for supervisors, and $39145 for those at higher levels. 
The pattern in average yearly earnings, when they are tabulated by the 
number of levels above, is less clear. The pattern that we observe is that" those 
with 2 or more levels of bosses get paid more that those with only 1 level of 
155 
f 
!"' 
,J 
I 
\ 
bosses (for below equals O or 1), but get paid less when there are 2 or more 
levels below. 
Table 5.3 fails to control for a number of other factors, such as education and 
experience. To allow for these other factors a more detailed empirical analysis 
is conducted in the rest of this section. 
Table 5.3 
Means and frequencies of real annual wage and salary income by 
hierarchical position for men working full-time (base year is 1987). 
Levels above Levels below respondent 
respondent 0 1 2 or more Total 
0 Mean $24898 $33626 $41600 $32612 
Frequency 76 73 57 206 
1 Mean $22911 $25189 $38565 $27260 
Frequency 81 81 46 208 
2 or more Mean $25566 $31229 $38245 $29989 
Frequency 279 156 126 561 
Total Mean $24956 $30215 $39145 $29961 
Frequency 436 310 229 975 
5.4.1 Estimating Equation 
We turn now to an empirical examination of the relationship between hierarchies 
and income. The theory surveyed in Section 5.2 did not suggest a particular 
functional form to estimate so the widely used human capital wage equation is 
utilized as the framework for the empirical analysis. 
Using annual income as the dependent variable would capture the effects 
of both how much people work and the rate at which they are paid. It is an 
empirical fact that hours do vary, however in the theoretical models everyone 
works the same amount of time (one period). Thus it is more natural to use 
156 
1, 
I 
l 
\ 
wages (hourly wage and salary income) rather than annual income. 
Ability and training are also likely to play an important role in determining 
wages. In the Calvo and Wellisz model workers had different abilities, but there 
were hierarchical effects beyond the effects of ability. In the Qian model workers 
were of identical ability. Either way it is important to correct as much as possible 
for an individual's ability before examining the effects of hierarchies. 
A leading approach for modeling the link between wages and ability is human 
capital theory. Humal.i. capital theory gives rise to the widely used wage equation 
of equation 5.1. 
1n Wi =a+ bSi + cEXPi + dEXP/ + eZi + ui (5.1) 
Where i denotes individual i, ln W is the natural logarithm of hourly wages, 
Sis years of schooling, EXP is length of time in the labor force, Z is a vector 
of other wage determining variables and u is a randomly distributed error term. 
The derivation of equation 5.1 using human capital theory is covered in 
Appendix B of this chapter. TherE; are other theoretical explanations for the 
wage equation, but for our purposes it is sufficient that it is the leading tool for 
the analysis of wages as a function of an individuals characteristics. 
The grand contract models suggest that the variables below=1, below=2, 
above=1 and above=2 should be included in the Z vector. The signs and signif-
icances of the various coefficients will determine which particular specification 
of the grand contract model matches with the empirical :6.ndin~s._. 
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Theory developed elsewhere and other empirical studies suggest that the 
variables on firm size and the variables married, metro and union should also be 
included in the analysis. For a survey of empirical results from human capital 
theory applied to Australia see Preston(1997). 
5.4.2 Regression Results 
Basic Model 
The results from the estimation of four models are shown in Table 5.5, the results 
for a selection of variables are summarized in Table 5.4. Log of nominal hourly 
earnings is used as the dependent variable in each regression. Survey results from 
four years have been used. In order to correct for inflation, a dummy variable is 
included for the year in which an observation was recorded. The omitted year 
is 1984. 
Three of the surveys are from consecutive years in the mid 1980's , so there is 
no a priori reason to expect that the independent variables may change in their 
effect on log wages over such a short period. The fourth survey is from 1995, 
making it plausible that there may have been some change in the relationship 
between the independent variables and lnwages. To allow for this possibility, 
each of the independent variables ( excluding the year dummies) is interacted 
with the dummy variable for 1995. This procedure w.as followed for a number 
of different model specifications and only two interactions, those for married 
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and union, showed to be statistically significant in any of these models. Hence, 
marriedx year95 and unionx year95 are included in each of the reported regres-
sions. The results on hierarchies are robust to the inclusion and exclusion of 
marriedx year95 and unionx year95. 
Model R5.1 is a basic wage equation plus dummy variables for being married, 
living in a large metropolitan area, and being a union member. These individual 
characteristics have frequently been shown in the work of other authors to be 
significan'i; determinants of wages in Australia, see Preston(1997). 
The coefficients in model R5.1 are similar to those commonly found in the 
literature on wages in Australia. For example, Preston (1997, p60) reports 
0.043 and -0.000765 as the coefficient estim,.a.tes for experience and experience2 
(for males in the private sector), neither of which are statistically significantly 
different to the corresponding estimates in R5.l. The effects of hierarchy and 
firm size variables are considered next. Some interesting results not directly 
related to hierarchies are discussed briefly in section 5.4.2. 
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Table 5.4 
Percentage change in wages as a result of 
one unit change in independent variable. 
Model 
R5.1 R5.2 R5.3 R5.4 
experience, evaluated at: 
experience = 5 3.06 2.65 2.89 2.59 
experience = 10 2.47 2.13 2.33 2.08 
experience = 20 1. 29 1.09 1.21 1.06 
Other variables 
education 6.84 6.12 6.22 5.70 
below=1 9.25 8.54 . 
below=2 21.9 18.0 
above=1 -1.70 -1.74 
above=2 10.1 2.61 
firm size: 10-99 15.1 12.1 
firm size: 100+ 27.2 22.3 
Hierarchy and Firm Results 
Model R5.2 is Model R5.l plus the variables on position in the hierarchy: be-
low=l , below=2, above=1, and above=2. Holding everything else constant , wages 
are approximately 9% higher for those in level 1 than for those in level 0. Sim-
ilarly, the wages of those in level 2 and higher are approximately 22% higher 
than those for level O workers ( everything else constant). This shows that wages 
increase with position in the hierarchy, even after correcting for an individual's 
observed education and experience. This result is consistent with Oonjectures 
10, 16 and 18. 
The above variables show that having two or more levels of superiors increases 
wages by 10% over those with either zero or one level of superiors. There_ is no 
significant difference between having one and zero levels of supervisors, every-
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thing else constant. These results for above and below indicate that both level 
in the hierarchy and height of the hierarchy have significant positive effects on 
wages. 
Comparing Model RS. l and Model RS.2, we see that the education and ex-
perience coefficients are smaller when we correct for hierarchy effects. However, 
these human capital effects are still positive and significant. 
Overall, these two sets of regression results show that both human capital 
and hierarchical factors are important in determining wages. 
Model RS.3 is Model RS.1 expanded to include firm size variables. Similar 
to other empirical findings, the firm size effect is positive and strongest for 
the largest companies. It is difficult to make direct comparisons with other 
studies because of different variable definitions and categories, however Miller 
and Mulvey (1996) also find approximately a 20 percentage point difference 
between the largest and smallest firms. Allowing for firm size also reduces the 
influence of the human capital variables. However, unlike the hierarchy variables, 
firm size reduces the coefficient on union significantly. 
i 
One problem with the analysis so far is that hierarchy and firm size effects are 
likely to be confounded because larger companies, in general, are more likely to 
have larger hierarchies. With the variables available, it is not possible to separate 
out the common influences. In Model RS.4 both the firm size and hierarchy 
variables are added to the simple Model RS.1 specification. This specification 
shows which effects are robust to the confounding problem. 
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Model R5.4 shows a similar pattern of returns to being a supervisor to that 
seen in Model R5.2. The effects in Model R5.4 are slightly smaller for below=1 
(0.7 percentage points approximately). For below=2, the decrease in the co-
efficient is much larger between Model R5.2 and Model R5.4. The coefficient 
decreases by 4 percentage points, which is an 18% decrease. 
Neither above=1 nor above=2 is significant in Model R5.4. The firm size 
effects also decrease in both size and significance when the hierarchy variables 
are also included. The magnitude of the decrease is quite large, indicating that 
ignoring level in the hierarchy ( as in Model R5.3) leads to an overestimation of 
the firm size effect by about 25%. 
The overall effect of both the firm size and hierarchy variables on the human 
capital variables is quite large. Comparing the coefficient on education in Model 
R5.1 with Model R5.4 shows that ignoring organizational effects leads to a 20% 
overestimation of the influence of education. 
Comparing the marginal effect of experience at the 5, 10 and 20 year levels, 
shown in Table 5.4, shows that the simple model R5. l overestimates by approx-
imately 20% on average, compared to R.54. Plots of the returns to experience, 
using the coefficients from Table 5.5, are shown in Figure 5.3. 
In summary, there is clear evidence that both traditional human capital 
variables and height in the hierarchy are important determinants of wages. This 
is consistent with the hierarchy models of both Calvo and Wellisz, and Qian. 
The Calvo and Wellisz approach is more attractive since it models both skill 
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and hierarchical position. 
It is also clear that there is another effect due to the organization in which 
an individual works. The exact nature of the effect , or more likely effects, is not 
revealed by the analysis here. However, this effect is positively related to both 
firm size and the height of the hierarchy above an individual. The presence of 
this positive relationship, whatever its exact form , clearly rejects Conjecture 14 
of a negative relationship, and also provides strong evidence against Conjecture 
11 of irrelevance of the rest of the organization. This leaves Conjecture 18, of 
a positive relationship between the number of levels above an individual and 
wages, as the best supported by the data. 
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Figure 5.3: Effect on lnwages of different levels of experience for the four regres-
sion models. 
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Diagnostics 
According to the Reset test, only the simple regression of R5.1 is mis-specified. 
Including either the firm size or hierarchy variables eliminates this mis-specification, 
again indicating the importance of organizational structure in determining wages. 
All the models exhibit heteroscedasticity. This causes 018 results to be 
consistent but inefficient. The White correction provides consistent estimates , 
of the standard errors, and it is these that are used in calculating the reported 
t-values. 
Other Results 
The results on the impact of union membership are interesting. Introducing 
variables that measure firm size into the basic equation of R5. l reduces the 
coefficient on union by 4.6 percentage points in R5.3. This matches almost 
exactly with the 5 percentage point bias found in Miller and Mulvey (1996). 
This effect is produced only by the firm size variables and not by the hierarchy 
variables. In R5.2 the union coefficient shows negligible difference to that in 
R5.l. Including both firm size and hierarchy variables reduces the effect, as 
compared to the basic model, to only a 2.7 percentage point reduction. However, 
there is in all four models a significant union membership effect. This is similar 
to other studies of the same period surveyed in Miller and Mulvey (1996). This 
is an example of one dimension in which firm size and hierarchy variables do not 
have the same effect. 
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Miller and Mulvey (1996) show that for the 1993 Survey of Training and 
Education the union effect is negligible (after controlling for firm size) in a re-
gression including a rich array of variables on the individual. Miller and Mulvey 
(1996, pl44) also replicate models from other studies with their data set and find 
a pattern which they claim is basically the same as in the original studies. Their 
claim is misleading, because although the replications have a similar pattern of 
relative magnitudes, the actual magnitudes are consistently smaller. In nine out 
of eleven comparisons Miller and Mulvey's (1996, p142-143) replications produce 
lower union effects. 
The results from Table 5.5 shows that the union effect in the middle 1980's 
is significantly __ different to that in 1995. In all four models, the coefficient on 
unionx year95 is sufficiently large and negative as to indicate no positive wage ef-
fect from union membership in 1995. This supports Mulvey and Miller's finding 
of a negligible wage effect for the mid 1990's , but casts doubt on their conclu-
sion that previous :findings of a union effect are due solely to omitted variable 
bias. The results presented here indicate that the presence of a union effect is 
dependent on the period considered. 
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Table 5.5 
OLS Regression Results 
Dependent Variable is lnwages ( t-stats in parenthesies) . 
R5.1 R5.2 R5.3 R5.4 
year86 0.060 0.048 0.075 0.067 
(1.868) (1.544) (2.460) (2.225) 
year81 0.175 0.175 0.181 0.184 
(5.532) (5.742) (5.851) (6.079) 
year95 0.542 0.547 0.559 0.567 
(8.190) (8 .543) (8.637) (8.896) 
education 0.068 0.061 0.062 0.057 
(11.881) (10.814) (11.091) (10.153) 
experience 0.037 0.032 0.035 ' 0.031 
(8.074) (7 .053) (7.818) (6.950) 
exp erience2 / l 00 -0.059 -0.052 -0.056 -0.051 
(-6.393) (-5.796) (-6.283) (-5 . 766) 
married 0.057 0.055 0.057 0.054 
(1.751) (1.691) (1.842) (1.735) 
metro 0.093 .072 0.071 0.064 
(3.756) (2.962) (2.952) (2.688) 
union 0.146 0.144 0.010 .120 
(5.566) (5.549) (3.799) ( 4.573) 
below=1 0.092 0.085 
(3.401) (3.194) 
below=2 0.219 0.180 
(7.279) (6.003) 
above=1 -0.017 -0.017 
(-0.438) (-0.456) 
above=2 0.101 0.026 
(3.057) (0.756) 
marriedx year95 0.117 0.104 0.115 .103 
(1.684) (1.552) (1. 701) (1.551) 
unionx year95 -0.161 -0.157 -0.186 -0.173 
(-2.650) (-2.700) (-3.188) (-3.023) 
firm size: 10-99 0.151 0 .121 
(3 .928) (3.071) 
firm size: 100+ 0.272 0.223 
(7.329) (5.467) 
constant 0.913 0.937 0.847 0.905 
(10.969) (10.962) (10.619) (10.713) 
N 975 975 975 975 
Adjusted-R2 0.478 0.510 0.513 0.523 
Reset (F[3, N - k - 3]) 3.16 1.50 1.56 0.63 
Cook-Weisberg (x2 (1)) 12.68 8.54 6.37 5.36 
White (x2 ( 1)) 15.23 10.43 8.28 7.08 
\ 
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5.5 Conclusion 
The brief survey of the grand contract literature showed that there are theoretical 
reasons for thinking that organizational structure, or more particularly hierarchy 
shape and hierarchical position, can be important in determining wages. Also 
this theoretical hierarchical effect is not due solely to the sorting of ability. 
The empirical findings indicate that both human capital variables and orga-
nizational/hierarchical variables are important in determining wages. The most 
robust result was that wages increase with level in the hierarchy, by approxi-
mately 9% per level. Failing to account for this effect overestimates the effect 
of education and experience by approximately 20%. 
,, 
It appears that there is a second organizational effect beyond level in the hi-
erarchy. This second, positive effect is determined by the size of the organization 
or hierarchy. This may be to do with the number of levels above an individual, 
or may be due to other, so called firm size effects such as a monopsony effect or 
regulation. · The results are somewhat confounded. 
The Qian model fits better overall with the empirical results, but the Calvo 
and Wellisz (1979) model is superior in its consideration of skill/ ability and 
hierarchical position. A combination of the two models might be better than 
either individually. There are other models of hierarchies not considered, and the 
models here are far from the final word on hierarchies. However , these ~odels 
have provided a useful framework for considering an aspect of jobs based analysis 
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within an extension of the traditional human capital approach. The empirical 
results indicate which of the current models fit best with the real world, and 
perhaps more importantly, indicate the properties that future models must have . 
There is a clear need for further research into the effects of organizational 
structure on wages. In particular, the firm size effects needs to be disaggregated 
into a number of effects with discernible causes. The work presented here in-
dicates the importance of organizational structure in wage determination and 
sheds light on some of the relevant issues by bringing together theoretical work 
on hierarchies with empirical testing. 
5.6 Appendix A 
Following the original exposition from Calvo and Wellisz(1979, p120-122) the 
result is shown by considering two simple hierarchical arrangements . In the 
first , the owner supervises workers directly ( there are only two tiers) in the 
second case there are three tiers, so that the owner supervises supervisors who 
in turn supervise the workers. 
When there are two tiers 
P2 = 1/ s1 (5.2) 
hence 
W2 = (s1 - l)k+h(/32). · (5.3) 
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The profit for the two level firm, 7r2, can be written as 
'lf 2 = f32x2 - W2X2 = f32s1 - W2S1 · 
Substituting in equation 5.3 gives 
7r2 = f32s1 - [(s1 - 1) k + h (/32)] 81. 
Thus the firms maximization problem is 
- * max 7r2 = 7r2. 
f32,s1 
Assuming the existence of an interior solution gives at the optimum 
h' (/32) = 1. 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
(5.6) 
(5.7) 
Now consider the three level case in which the owner supervises x 2 = 8 1 
supervisors who supervise x3 = s28 1 production workers. The respective proba-
bilities for detecting someone shirking at level l are 
1 
P2 = X2 (5.8) 
and 
p3 = {32 = f32X2 (5.9) 
S2 X3 
The respective wages are 
W2 = (x2 - 1) k + h (/32) (5.10) 
and 
W3 = ( 13::2 - 1) k + h (/33). (5.11) 
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Total profit for this three level firm, 7r3 is the output of the workers less the 
wages payments for the workers and the level 2 supervisors: 
7r 2 = /33X3 - W2X2 - W3X3 · 
Substituting in the expressions for the wages gives 
Jr2 = /33X3 - [ (
13
::
2 
-1) k + h (/33)] X3 - [(x2 -1) k + h\/32)]x2. 
By definition 
* 
7r2 max 1r2 
/32 ,X2 ,/33,X3. 
max ( maxi,3,x3 {f33X3 - [ (:a;;; - 1) k + h (/33)] x3} ) . 
/32 ,x2 - [ ( X2 - 1) k + h (/32)] X2 
(5.12) 
(5.13) 
(5.14) 
For simplicity let 82 be the effective, as opposed to the physical, span of control 
at level 2, then 
Substituting and rearranging: 
X3 
82 = f32x2. 
1r; = max ( f32x2max133,s2 {/3382 - [(82 - l)k + h(/33)]82}) 
J32,x2 - [(x2 - 1) k + h (/32)] X2 · 
Thus from equations it follows that 
1r; = max (f32x21r; - [(x2 - 1) k + h (/32)] x2). 
/32,x2 
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5.7 Appendix B: Derivation of an Earnings Fune-
tior1 
The following derivation of an earnings function is based on pioneering work 
in Mincer (197 4) and Mincer(1993, pp7 4-75) and a standard contemporary 
exposition of a Mincer style empirical earnings function from Chapman and 
Iredale(1993, Appendix A). 
Let Et be gross earnings in period t and Ct is the dollar amount of net 
investments made in period t. Then if Tt is the rate of return on net investment 
made in period t 
Et = Et-l + Tt-l Ct-l, (5.17) 
since any increase in earnings at t over those at t - 1 can only be the result 
of a new income stream arising from new investment . In general, Tt-l could 
differ between time periods and between individuals, we however suppress the 
subscript and use r the average rate of return on the individuals investments in 
human capital. 
The dollar amounts of investments in human capital are not readily observ-
able. Instead, if investment is included as time spent in investment, then the 
ratio of investment expenditure to gross earnings can be used as time-equivalent 
units of investment. 
Let 
kt= Ct/Et (5.18) 
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then 
Et = Et-1 (1 + rkt-1) ( 5.19) 
and by recursion 
Et= Eo(l + rko)(l + rk1) ... (l + rkt-1). (5.20) 
Now for small values of rki, ln(l + rki) can be approximated by rki. Thus 
equation 5.20 can be written: 
t-1 
ln Et = 1n Eo + r L ki. (5.21) 
i=O 
Analyzing the schooling and post schooling experiences individually, the sum 
can be separated to run over the years of schooling ( up to year s) and the post 
school years, giving 
s-1 t-1 
lnEt = lnEo + T 8 L ki + Tp L kj. (5.22) 
i=O j=s 
The assumption on rates of return is relaxed to allow different returns be-
tween investment in school and post school investment ( denoted r 8 and r P , re-
spectively). Now ki is taken as not being that different from 1 during the school 
years. Thus (2.6) becomes 
t-1 
lnEt = lnEo + T 8 S + Tp Lkj. 
j=s 
(5.23) 
Post schooling investments are expected to decline over the lifetime ( as re-
tirement approaches the expected returns from new investment falls) . Hence 
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equation 5.23 may be approximated by including a quadratic experience term. 
Thus the standard wage equation to estimate is: 
ln Wi =a+ bSi + cEXPi + dEXPl + eZi + ui. (5.24) 
Where i denotes these are the characteristics of individual i, ln W is the 
natural logarithm of hourly wages , S is years is schooling, EXP is length of 
time in the labor force, Z is a vector of other wage determining variables and u 
is a randomly distributed error term. 
5.8 Appendix C: Diagnostic Tests 
The results of tests for mis-specification and heteroscedasticity are reported at 
the bottom of Table 5.5. The form of the tests is now briefly described for a 
regression of the form Y = XB + E. 
The Reset test, is a test for mis-specification in the regression equation. The 
version here performs the regression Y = X B + ZT +c, where Z = { Y2 , Y3 , Y4 } , 
and then performs an F test to determine if T = 0. Where the null hypothesis 
(T = 0) is no mis-specification. 
Only the simple regression of R5. l is mis-specified. Including either the firm · 
size or hierarchy variables eliminates this mis-specification, again indicating the 
importance of organizational structure in determining wages. 
Cook and Weisberg is a test for heteroscedasticity. It amounts to testing 
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T = 0 in the regression var[1o] = c,2 exp (YT). See Cook and Weisberg(l983) 
for details. White is the standard White test for heteroscedasticity. It tests 
T = 0 in the regression of var[c] on the fitted values of the dependent variable. 
In both cases the null is homoscedasticity. 
All the models exhibit heteroscedasticity. This causes OLS results to be 
consistent but inefficient. The White correction provides consistent estimates 
of the standard errors, and it is these that are used in calculating the report 
values. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
6.1 The Production of Management 
This thesis has analyzed management as a production process that occurs across 
a structure of individuals. Two general classes of models have been used to 
describe this process: information processing models and supervisions models. 
The differences between the two classes of models are most easily characterized 
by considering the direction in which the management product flows. 
In the information processing approach, there is a decision to be made on the 
basis of some information. Information is split amongst a number of managers 
so that different parts of the decision can be worked on concurrently, decreasing · 
the elapsed time taken to make the decision. Each manager works on their part 
of the problem and then passes their result/conclusion up to a superior. In this 
way, output flows up the hierarchy, finally merging into one result, which is the 
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decision. 
The flow is in the opposite direction in the supervision models. Managerial 
effectiveness and monitoring work their way recursively down the hierarchy. 
Total output for a firm is determined by the effort of production workers at 
the bottom of the hierarchy, and by the effectiveness with which the production 
workers are managed. Monitoring to ensure effort, and managerial effectiveness 
are both applied to a production worker by her immediate supervisor. In a 
similar way the output ( of supervision and managemer1t) by the supervisor are 
regulated by the monitoring and supervision supplied by her superior. In this 
way these twin factors of monitoring and management flow down the hierarchy, 
from the owner to the production workers, to determine total output. 
Three things were done with these models in the proceeding chapters. In 
chapter 2, some extensions to the basic information processing model were con-
sidered. In chapters 3 and 4, a real time version of the information processing 
model was applied to the problem of production location within a differentiated 
product model from industrial organization. Chapter 5 is an empirical analysis 
of the effect of hierarchies on wages, with particular attention paid to testing 
the varying conclusions from different versions of the grand contract supervision 
model. 
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6.2 Main Findings 
Chapter 2 considered two extensions to the basic one shot model of informa-
tion processing proposed by Radner(1993). Those extensions are time based 
measures for the managerial labor input and fallible performance by managers. 
The original information processing model used the number of managers to 
measure the managerial labor input. Clearly this measure fails to take into 
account the connection normally made between the amount of time a person 
works and their pay. The piece rate regime just pays for the time people actually 
work. The alternative is that people are also paid while they are idle between 
tasks. The salary regime is proposed as an approximation for this in the one 
shot model. 
It is shown, somewhat surprisingly, that the set of efficient hierarchies is 
equivalent under these different measures of managerial resource cost. The re-
turns to scale with a linear loss function are also considered for the salary regime 
and show results different to the fix cost per employee situation considered in 
Radner (1993). 
The second half of chapter 2 proposed two ways in which managers can be-
come fallible. They can make mistakes in the result they pass up the hierarchy 
or they can be late in passing the message. Here these two types of fallibility 
are used to more finely characterize the choice of hierarchy by a firm. Mor~ gen-
erally these concepts are important for developing a theory of fallible networks, 
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which would have immediate application to areas such as banking, nuclear power 
management and air traffic control, where a clear bad or catastrophic decision 
exists. 
Chapters 3 and 4 contain the major theoretical contribution of the thesis. 
They show how the relationship between hierarchical structure and product 
market behavior can be explicitly modeled. This synthesis between traditional 
industrial organization and formal organizational theory appears to offer an 
alternative to the behavioral based theories of the firm which currently form the 
bridge between economics and management. 
The model considers a real time decision problem with endogenous choice of 
the quantity of information. Specifically it was shown that the optimal choice / 
of organization for a monopolist in a dynamic differentiated products market is 
determined by the speed at which market conditions change. 
The model assumed that consumer preferences changed over time, according 
to a stochastic process and were not observable. The analysis was initially ap-
plied to a fixed price settling and then extended to allow price to be set optimally 
once location was chosen. Simulations showed that profit was increasing in the 
width of appeal for the product and decreasing in the speed of change in market 
conditions. A product which can capture a larger market at the same cost will in 
general produce a larger profit. As the shocks to consumer preferences increase 
the accuracy of any forecast will decrease and hence profits will also decrease. 
The dependence of optimal organizational size on market conditions was also 
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shown. Taking a larger market research sample requires a larger organization 
and gives a good picture of the past. A smaller organization using less data can 
act faster but has a poorer historical picture. Thus there are forces pushing for 
both a larger and a smaller firm. The relative magnitudes of these two forces is 
determined by the rate at which consumer preferences change, which therefore 
determines optimal firm size. 
The formal model gives other interesting insights. For example, suboptimal 
choice of hierarchy is less critical for both stable environments and products 
with smaller widths of appeal. It is also shown that specialized products attain a 
higher expected fraction of their potential maximum profit than general products 
do. 
Chapter 5 examines the other market on which a firm 's hierarchy has an 
impact: the labor market. The supervisory models of hierarchies are currently 
better suited to addressing questions of wage determination than the information 
processing models which were used in the earlier chapters. No new theoretical 
results are proved in this chapter, rather the existing theory is surveyed and 
interpreted so as to produce empirically testable conclusions. The variants on 
the grand contract supervisory model all predict that wages will increase with 
level in the hierarchy. The implications for the effect of the number of levels 
above an individual covered all possibilities, positive , negative and zero. 
Empirical analysis showed that wages did indeed increase with level in the 
hierarchy, and that this result is robust to various model specification. It is also 
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shown that omitting the hierarchy variables from a traditional wages equation 
overestimates the effects of education and experience by about 10%. The other 
results show that beside level in the hierarchy, the structure of the firm is also 
important. However, it is not possible to tell if it is the increasing size of the 
hierarchy or the increasing firm size that have a positive affect on wages. 
The thesis highlights a number of important areas for future research, the 
most obvious is the extension of the monopolist hierarchy analysis to an oligopoly 
setting. This is a subject of current research. The empirical section provides 
some important new facts for those modeling hierarchies, but also indicates the 
need for more facts. This is also a current topic of research with case studies on 
hierarchical structure in a number of large firms. 
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